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INTRODUCTION

Expanding upon the regulatory reform initiatives that began during the Bush Administration, l the Clinton Administration proceeded
with an ambitious plan comprised of twenty-five initiatives to reinvent
environmental regulation. 2 Most of these initiatives promote multimedia approaches to regulation, reflecting a consensus among environmentalists, industry, and scholars that multimedia regulation offers
the greatest potential for improving the existing system of environmental regulation, which largely regulates a single medium at a time.
While many of these multimedia initiatives are innovative and controversial, this Article will focus on Project XL-for excellence and leadership-because it incorporates all of the alternative compliance
methods that are used to some extent in other reform initiatives, including multimedia emission caps and performance-based standards. 3
The multimedia approach in Project XL is simply the most dramatic of
several other initiatives; accordingly, a discussion of Project XL will
illustrate the promise and potential pitfalls in other regulatory reform
initiatives.
Enthusiasm for Project XL is great. Gordon Moore, Chairman of
the Board of Intel Corporation, a participant in Project XL,4 sees "a
real paradigm shift." According to Moore, "the new system envisioned by Project XL is to work cooperatively and focus on the results: a cleaner environment; a faster, less costly system; with more
input from the local community."5 As some EPA pilot projects have
See generally Part I.B.2.c.
See generally BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 2 passim (1995) [hereinafter CLINTON & GORE]; Reinvention at EPA, Testimony
Before Senate Appropriation Comm., l04th Congo (1996) (testimony of Fred Hansen, Dep1.

2.

uty Administrator, EPA), available at http://www.epa.gov/partners/reinventlhansen.htm
(visited Feb. 26, 1998) [hereinafter Hansen Testimony). See also infra Part I.B.2.c.
3. See generally Part I.B.2.c.

4.
5.

See generally id.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, COMMON-SENSE STRATEGIES To PRO-

TECI' PuBLIC HEALTH: A PROGRESS REpORT ON REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 9 [hereinafter EPA, A PROGRESS REpORT ON REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION)'
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 3 1998-1999
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already demonstrated, Project XL has the potential to reduce both
regulatory costs and pollution by allowing companies to try innovative
pollution control strategies that are customized for individual facilities
rather than relying on the current one-size-fits-all approach to environmental regulation. Furthermore, Project XL will allow companies
to take a multimedia approach to pollution rather than treat air, land,
and water pollution as unrelated issues, as in the present system.
But despite the enthusiasm, it is unclear whether EPA has the
legal authority to adopt its reform initiatives. In many cases, firms
seek to waive existing statutory or regulatory requirements that mandate the use of best available technology, a specified percentage reduction in the amount of pollution, pollution monitoring, or reporting
requirements. 6 A high-level EPA official has suggested that many
regulatory reinvention proposals can be made without further amendments to existing environmental statutes.7 Anonymous EPA employees, however, have suggested that "'if it isn't illegal, it isn't XL."'8
EPA acknowledged the possibility that statutes may limit the scope of
its flexibility and promised to reexamine the issue in late 1997. 9
Furthermore, regulatory reform is not without its critics. Environmentalists frequently argue that weakening technology-based pollution reduction monitoring or reporting requirements will cause
serious harm to the environment and public health.lO In addition,
many environmentalists are worried that the shift from national, uniform regulatory standards to a more individualized, site-specific ap6. See generally Part I.B.2.b.
7. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRA·
STRUGrURE, 104TH CONG., AN ASSESSMENT OF EPA's REINVENTION 7 n.52 (Comm. Print
Sept. 1996) (citing Subcomm. on Tech. and Subcomm. on Energy and the Env. of the
Comm. on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, June 20, 1996 (testimony of David Gardiner, Assistant Administrator, EPA Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation» (visited
Oct. 31, 1996)<http://www.house.gov/transportationlhotissue/invent.htm> [hereinafter AN
ASSESSMENT OF EPA's REINVENTION].
8. See Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor
Have Any Clothes, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) (News & Analysis) 10,527 (Oct. 1996)
(citing What's Up With Project XL-Week of 3/11/96, Project XL Update).
9. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOfRCED-97-155, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHALLENGES FACING EPA's EFFORTS TO REINVENT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 10 (1997) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. In 1996, the Senate
considered a bill that would have authorized Project XL, but the bill appears to have died.
See Innovative Compliance Act, S. 2160, 104th Congo (1996) (proposing to authorize waivers from regulatory requirements if (1) facility complies with all other environmental or
public health standards; (2) the alternative compliance strategy will achieve "better overall
environmental re~>ults" than under existing rules; (3) there are no adverse cross-media impacts; and (4) the alternative compliance strategy is enforceable and open to public scrutiny to the same extent as the waived requirement); Jody Freeman, Collaborative
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1,90-91 n.282 (1997). This Article provides a far more detailed proposal to achieve many of that bill's goals.
10. See infra Part II.B.2.
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 4 1998-1999
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proach will weaken the ability of the public to challenge industry
claims. l l In particular, they are worried that local environmental
groups lack the resources to evaluate the cross-media and cross-pollutant trading schemes incorporated in many industry regulatory reform
proposals. 12
The focus of this Article is twofold. First, the Article will show
that EPA's reform initiatives are severely hampered by a lack of legal
authority, and proposes that Congress give EPA sufficient authority to
enact needed reforms. Second, this Article will address concerns that
reform will lead to inferior environmental protection and public participation. This Article proposes a number of statutory provisions to
ensure that, once EPA has sufficient authority to pursue its reform
agenda the agency will do so in a way that avoids a diminution of
public health safeguards.
Part I of this Article analyzes the various impediments to EPA's
reform agenda and ways of overcoming these impediments. Part I.A
shows that most existing statutes address only a single medium and
generally ignore impacts on other media. Part I.B demonstrates that a
multimedia approach to environmental regulation is generally more
desirable and examines several EPA multimedia regulatory reform initiatives. Part I.C illustrates how current single-medium statutes, Congress' fragmented committee structure, and EPA's single-medium
administrative scheme all work together to create serious obstacles to
multimedia reform initiatives. Part I.D discusses different strategies
for achieving regulatory flexibility. Most importantly, Part I proposes
that, instead of muddling through on an ad hoc basis to address statutory restrictions, Congress should enact a statute that would authorize
EPA to proceed with its regulatory reform agenda.
Part II proposes that this reform should only be undertaken if it
addresses concerns about delegating authority to EPA, guarantees
public participation, and meets statutory performance-based goals. An
authorizing statute is suggested that would require EPA to assemble
diverse stakeholder groups to participate in preliminary negotiations,
provide funding to these stakeholders so they can meaningfully challenge industry data, and hold a public hearing before granting a permit. Each participating firm would have to issue an annual report
examining the risks and benefits of their alternative compliance
methods.
Part II.A addresses concerns about Congress delegating too much
authority to EPA, and explains how delegation can work without giving the agency excessive discretion. Part II.B explores the case against
11.
12.

See id.
See infra Part II.C.b.iii.
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an integrated multimedia approach to regulation and EPA's inadequate efforts to respond to those concerns. Part II.C makes proposals
that would guarantee meaningful public participation, preserve Congress' role in supervising the agency's performance, and ensure that
regulatory flexibility does not turn into regulatory laxity.
I

THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION OF THE
ENVIROMENTAL PROTEGrION AGENCY'S (EPA)
REFORM INITIATIVES

A.

The Single Medium Approach

For the most part, environmental statutes address only one medium such as air, water, or land. Chief among these statutes are the
Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, each of which deals exclusively with its namesake medium. 13 Two other major statutes, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) ought to apply to releases in all media,14 but in
practice primarily address only land disposal issues. IS
The two other major environmental statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA), are supposed to have brought an integrated approach to environmental management, but in fact have had little impact on EPA's
media policies. 16 A textualist reading of NEPA would require EPA to
consider multimedia impacts when the agency issues rules that would
significantly impact the environment. However, Congress and the
courts have largely exempted EPA rule making under the major singlemedium statutes from NEPA's requirement of issuing an environmen13. See Adam Babich, RCRA Imminent Hazard Authority: A Powerful Tool for Businesses, Governments, and Citizen Enforcers, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,122,
10,130-31 (March 1994); Clean Air Act: Enforcement Authority Guidance, 56 Fed. Reg.
24,393, 24,398 (1991) [hereinafter Enforcement Authority Guidance]'
14. See Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d
1305 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) addresses lead shot polluting water);
Comite Pro Rescate de la Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 888 F.2d 180, 182
(1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990) (holding RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) addresses fumes from sewer lines); Orchard Lane Rd. Ass'n v. Peter Lien & Sons, 34 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1749 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) addresses release
of silica dust to air); 40 C.F.R. pt. 264, subpts. AA & BB (1996) (containing RCRA regulations for "Air Emission Standards for Process Vents" and "Air Emission Standards for
Equipment Leaks"); Enforcement Authority Guidance, supra note 13.
15. See generally ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 468-70 (4th ed. 1995) (pointing out that Congress enacted
RCRA and CERCLA largely to address land disposal issues).
16. See Bradford C. Mank, What Comes After Technology: Using an "Exception Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 263, 293 (1994) [hereinafter Mank, Exception Process].
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 6 1998-1999
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tal impact statement for all significant environmental actions. Their
basic premise has been that the agency's rulemaking is the "functional
equivalent" of such a statementP It appears that the TSCA would
give EPA authority to move towards the administrative implementation of an integrated approach.1 8 However, the agency has not used
this statute often for that purpose, perhaps because the TSCA requires the agency to justify any total or partial ban of substances upon
"substantial evidence" in the rulemaking record taken as a whole 19
and because of the "least burdensome requirements."2o Accordingly,
despite the TSCA and NEPA, it is fair to say that the United States
lacks an effective organic statute that addresses environmental
problems comprehensively?1
B.
1.

The Need for Integrated Pollution Control

Problems with the Single Medium Approach

Many commentators have argued that, rather than treat each medium as unrelated to the others,22 EPA should adopt an integrated
approach to pollution control that would address pollution problems
on a multimedia basis. They argue that controls on air pollutants, for
instance, often result in the discharge of the same chemicals into the
land or water without reducing the total number of harmful substances released into the environment. 23 For example, the Clean Air
17. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-opening of the Environmental Mind, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 463, 477-79, 484-87, 490-92; Mank, Exception Process,
supra note 16, at 293 n.134.
18. See Guruswamy, supra note 17, at 522-30; Mank, Exception Process, supra note
16, at 293 n.134.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i).
20. See Robert V. Percival, Presentation at American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting, Joint Program of Sections on Environmental Law and Torts and Compensation Systems, Three Perspectives on Risk: Common Law, Environmental Regulation and
Law and Economics, Jan. 6, 1997, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 513, 520 (1997); see generally 15
U.S.c. § 2605(a); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991); Thomas
O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor
Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REv. 525, 548 (1997) ("In the six years that have passed since the
Corrosion Proof Fittings opinion, EPA has not initiated a single action under section 6 of
TSCA, and it is not likely to use section 6 to impose requirements that regulatees oppose
until it is amended to overrule the court's opinion.").
21. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Essay, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation:
The Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457, 461 (1996).
22. See Frances H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and Protecting the Environment, 22 ENVTL. L. 1, 10-11 (1992); Mank, Exception Process, supra note
16, at 293; see Guruswamy, supra note 17, at 467-69, 476-79, 488-92, 516; see generally
James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On Integrated Pollution Control, 22 ENVTL. L. 119
(1992).
23. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 2, at 40, Appendix A, No. 24 ("multiple permits
may result in undesirable cross-media transfer of pollutants"); Guruswamy, supra note 17,
at 467-69, 488-92; Irwin, supra note 22, at 12-14 (listing seven reasons for integrated pollution control); Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 294.
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 7 1998-1999
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Act requires most utilities burning high-sulfur coal to use scrubbers to
remove sulfur dioxide from flue gases, but this type of air pollution
control produces three to six tons of scrubber sludge for every ton of
sulfur dioxide removed from the air. 24 Industry deposits most of this
sludge in landfills. 25 Some types of air pollutants, such as cadmium,
are more dangerous if they reach the ground and contaminate food
than if they are simply inhaled. Accordingly, air pollution regulation
can actually increase the risk to public health. 26
In addition, pollution from one medium often affects other media. For example, a significant amount of water pollution is caused by
air pollutants that fall directly into waterways or that fall on the land
and then are carried into the nation's watersP In fact, the single largest source of lead, zinc, and copper pollution in the Great Lakes is not
direct discharge into the water, but atmospheric deposition. 28
Moreover, there are serious problems with existing single-medium programs that EPA can solve only by switching to a multimedia
approach to environmental regulation. The current regime of multiple medium-specific permits often results in EPA or state agencies
imposing "overlapping, poorly-coordinated and contradictory requirements" and may also allow some types of pollution to "fall through
the cracks."29 As will be discussed below, this regulatory problem occurred at the Amoco Oil Company's refinery in Yorktown, Virginia.
Because EPA was focusing on one problem at a time rather than the
big picture existing regulations focused on benzene emissions from
wastewater plants, while ignoring a larger problem with benzene emissions from loading docks.30
Also, some believe that medium-specific strategies foster "endof-the-pipe" pollution control techniques to treat, store, or dispose of
waste, rather than encouraging pollution prevention or alternative
compliance methodologies.31 For instance, the Clean Water Act requires municipalities to operate sewage plants, but on average these
facilities remove only fifty percent of toxic chemicals and allow twenty
percent of the remainder to leach into the air, fifteen percent into the
24.
25.
26.
27.

See
See
See
See

Guruswamy, supra note 17, at n.22.

id.
id.

ENVTL. PROTECfION AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, THE STATE OF
CHESAPEAKE BAY 1995 14 (1995) (reporting that 11 % of the nitrogen falling into Chesapeake Bay falls directly into the water and that atmospheric nitrogen falling onto the land
and reaching the water accounts for an additional 16%).
28. See Guruswamy, supra note 17, at 468 n.21.
29. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 2, at 40, Appendix A, No. 24.
30. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
31. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: AN INTEGRATED ApPROACH COULD REDUCE POLLUTION AND INCREASE REGULATORY EFFICIENCY (1996) (GAOIRCED-96-41) [hereinafter GAO, Integrated Approach].
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 8 1998-1999
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land as sewage sludge, and another fifteen percent into the water. 32
The traditional approach to pollution control would concentrate on
developing more effective (and usually more expensive) removal technologies. A better approach would be to prevent these toxics either
from entering the sewage plant at all or from being created in the first
place. 33
Furthermore, some representatives of industry contend that using
a different set of requirements for each medium increases the cost and
complexity of compliance with environmental regulations. 34 Each single-medium statute typically creates a separate set of complex regulations, requires industry to apply for separate permits, often mandates
different types of pollution control equipment, and usually imposes
separate reporting and monitoring obligations, hence increasing the
overall cost of regulation.

2.

The Promise of Reform

In response to a congressional request,35 the National Academy
of Public Administration reviewed EPA's performance and concluded
that the agency should attempt to integrate its responsibilities under
various statutes into a more comprehensive and flexible approach.36
The report was another indication that EPA needs to experiment with
and adopt multimedia regulatory reforms and suggested that multimedia approaches to regulation possess great promise. 37
Simple emissions averaging that involves the same pollutant and
the same medium is relatively well accepted today even by many environmentalists. 38 But EPA clearly needs to extend single-medium pollution averaging and trading to a multimedia basis to achieve both
cost and pollution reductions. Cross-pollutant trading or averaging
would allow participants to trade decreased emissions of one aggregate type of pollutant-e.g., volatile organic compounds-for increased emissions of another class of pollutants-e.g., sulfur dioxide
and nitrogen oxide. 39 Cross-media trading or averaging would allow a
32. See Guruswamy, supra note 17, at 468-69 n.23.
33. See id.
34. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 2, at 40, Appendix A, No. 24.
35. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, SETTING PRIORITIES,
GETTING RESULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR EPA 102 (1995) (Table 5.1) [hereinafter
NAPA]; Fiorino, supra note 21, at 468.
36. See NAPA, supra note 35, at 4, 30, 103, 132.

37. See id.
38. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985) (advocating EPA use of emissions
"bubble" and "tradeoff" policies); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive Based
Environmental Regulation, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991).
39. Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,530-31 (citing Merck & Co., Inc., Project XL for Facilities Final Project Agreement Application, Stonewall Plant, Elkton, Va. (July 28, 1995»;
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 9 1998-1999
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participant to shift the allocation of the same pollutant among different media, resulting in, for example, lower releases into surface water
in exchange for higher releases into the air or land. 40
Industry generally supports the use of cross-pollutant or crossmedia trading or averaging because it may be cheaper to control one
pollutant than another, or to reduce water pollution than air pollution.41 Furthermore, emissions caps that allow these types of trades
can give industries the flexibility to make process changes without
amending their permits.42 In fact, Intel Corporation pursued a Project
XL agreement with EPA primarily because it wanted flexibility to
make rapid process changes at its facility in Chandler, Arizona without having to go through time-consuming permit changes. 43
Even some environmentalists would agree that the issue is not
whether to adopt multimedia emissions caps, but how to do so in a
way that protects public health and the environment. 44 The real issues
are the extent to which society should allow reductions in one medium
to offset small increases in another, and the identification of the situations in which different types of pollutants may be averaged as long as
the total risk to the public remains the same or is lessened by the
averaging scheme. Existing statutory requirements, however, disallow
many types of multimedia pollution averaging or trading, and demonstrate the need for legislation to allow multimedia reforms that are
essential in achieving cheaper and more effective regulation.

a.

Bubbles and Emissions Caps

In single-medium, same-pollutant regulation, EPA has already
successfully used emissions bubbles and caps to reduce the expense of
but see Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 281-88 (questioning EPA proposal during Bush administration to allow emissions averaging of different carcinogens and even
noncarcinogens because of serious uncertainties about the risks of each carcinogen and
broader policy concerns about the ability of society to compare the risks of different
chemicals).
40. Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,530-31 (citing Merck & Co., Inc., Project XL for Facilities Final Project Agreement Application, Stonewall Plant, Elkton, Va. (July 28, 1995»;
but see Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 336-37 (discussing limitations in EPA
exposure assessments and potentially troubling implications for minority groups whose
consumption patterns may differ from the agency's assumptions about how most people
eat, work or live).
41. See Timothy J. Mohin, The Alternative Compliance Model: A Bridge to the Future
of Environmental Management, [July 1997 News & Analysis] 27 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl L.
Inst.) (News & Analysis) 10,345, 10,350-53 (Mohin is Government Affairs Manager for
Environmental Health and Safety Issues at Intel Corporation).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. As discussed in Part II, however, there is considerable controversy about the use
of either cross-pollutant or cross-media trading because such trading may allow trade-offs
between pollutants and media when there may be substantial scientific uncertainty as to
whether overall risk is diminished in the trade. See infra Part II.B.1.
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regulation while at the same time achieving greater pollution reductions. For a number of years, EPA has allowed some firms to place an
imaginary "bubble" over a facility which allows the firm to average
certain emission requirements that otherwise apply to smaller units.45
For instance, EPA might require air pollution equipment on a boiler
to achieve ninety percent efficiency. A "bubble" or averaging program allows a firm to average Boiler A's eighty-five percent efficiency
with Boiler B's ninety-five percent efficiency to achieve an overall average of ninety percent, assuming that the two boilers emit the same
amount of pollutants. Economists generally favor "bubbles" because
it may be cheaper to increase the efficiency of Boiler B than Boiler A,
and averaging therefore allows a facility to achieve ninety percent efficiency at less COSt. 46 This type of averaging must be extended on a
multimedia basis to reap the full benefits of reform.

b.

The Yorktown Experiment

The Yorktown study discussed below illustrates not only the potential benefits of multimedia regulatory reform but also the need for
legislative reform discussed more fully in Part I.C This study showed
that focusing on a facility's total emissions, rather than on the amount
of pollution going to each individual medium or coming from particular smokestacks, can result in cheaper and more effective regulation.
Despite the clear benefits of reform, the company indicated that it
would do nothing because under the existing statutory and regulatory
framework EPA lacks the authority to relax existing mandates in exchange for innovative approaches that achieve greater net reductions
in pollution.
In 1990, EPA and Amoco Oil Company announced a cooperative
pilot study at Amoco's Yorktown, Virginia refinery to examine pollution prevention and alternative permitting strategies. 47 In 1992 and
1993, Amoco and EPA reported that it indeed was possible to reduce
45. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 859-66 (1984) (holding that EPA had authority under Clean Air Act to authorize use of "bubbles" in areas not in attainment with National Ambient Air Quality
Standards); Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 38, at 1341-49, 1364-65 (discussing use of
"bubbles" and other economic incentives to improve the incentive structures and efficiency
of environmental statutes and regulations).
46. For illustrations of these regulatory strategies, see Ackerman & Stewart, supra
note 38, at 1341-49. Some environmentalists have opposed emissions averaging because
they want Boiler A to achieve 90% efficiency on its own and still require Boiler B to meet
95% efficiency.
47. See Ronald E. Schmitt, The Amoco/EPA Yorktown Experience and Regulating the
Right Thing, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 11 (Schmitt is director of Environmental Performance Management for Amoco); Pollution Prevention: Pilot Project Cut Pollution at
Less Cost Than Mandated Rules, Amoco Official Says, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 903, 903
(Sept. 24, 1993) [hereinafter Amoco Official Says]; EPA, Amoco Launch Pollution Prevention Project, 14 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 70 (April 20, 1990).
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pollution at less cost than is allowed under current regulatory requirements.48 The refinery was spending $31 million to rebuild its wastewater treatment system to reduce benzene emissions, which are
carcinogenic. However, EPA regulations did not then require any
controls at the refinery's marine loading docks, which emitted far
more benzene pollution and could be controlled for only $6 million.49
In addition, the study found that while Amoco reduced airborne hydrocarbon and listed waste emissions by about 7,300 tons per year at a
cost of $2,400 per ton, if EPA had the authority to allow more flexible
compliance strategies, Amoco could have reduced its hydrocarbon
emissions by approximately the same amount at a cost of only $500
per ton. 50 Under existing statutes or agency regulations, there were
no provisions allowing EPA to exempt the refinery from rebuilding
the wastewater treatment facility in exchange for controlling a greater
amount of benzene emissions from the loading docks or to adopt alternative compliance strategies for controlling hydrocarbons. 51
The joint Amoco-EPA study concluded that current administrative procedures discouraged an integrated approach to multimedia
pollution. 52 It recommended that Congress or EPA provide incentives
for firms to conduct facility-wide assessments that would enable them
to develop pollution prevention and multimedia reduction strategies. 53 However, because the major issue at the Yorktown refinery
was controlling different sources of benzene or hydrocarbon emissions, the study did not fully address the difficult problem of whether
it is appropriate to ease regulation of one class of pollutant in exchange for more stringent regulation of another type of pollutant, including carcinogens. 54 Nevertheless, the Yorktown experiment was so
promising that it encouraged EPA to begin several pilot or experimental multimedia alternative compliance programs. 55
48. See Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 324-25; Schmitt, supra note 47, at
13, 51; see generally AMocofU.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, YORKTOWN
POLLUTION PREVENTION PROJECT: PROJECT SUMMARY (1992) [hereinafter AMOCO].
49. See AMOCO, supra note 48, at viii, 1-7, 1-11, 1-12; Mank, Exception Process, supra
note 16, at 324-25.
50. See Fiorino, supra note 21, at 462; Schmitt, supra note 47, at 13.
51. See AMOCO, supra note 48, at ix, 1-12, 1-15, 1-16; Mank, Exception Process, supra
note 16, at 325.
52. See AMOCO, supra note 48, at ix, 1-18; Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at
325.
53. See AMOCO, supra note 48, at 1-17, 1-18; Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16,
at 325.
54. See generally Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 281-88 (questioning EPA
proposal during Bush administration to allow emissions averaging of different carcinogens
and even noncarcinogens because of serious uncertainties about the risks of each carcinogen and broader policy concerns about the ability of society to compare the risks of different chemicals).
55. See infra Part I.B.2.c.i.
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Reform Initiatives

The EPA is convinced that regulatory reform, especially multimedia regulation, can fulfill the promise of the Yorktown study and
achieve better results at less cost. However, each of its reform initiatives, to a greater or lesser extent, suffers from the general problem
that no legal authority exists for EPA to relax certain requirements in
exchange for greater environmental benefits. Accordingly, as Part I.C
explains, legislative authorization giving EPA greater authority to substitute individualized, multimedia regulation at specific facilities in
lieu of generic requirements would benefit all of these programs.
Beginning during the Bush Administration and continuing during
the Clinton Administration, EPA has begun a number of regulatory
reform initiatives to create more flexible permits and emphasize performance-based standards rather than compliance with mandatory
regulatory techniques. 56 These initiatives have set the stage for the
agency's most ambitious initiative, Project XL, which Part I.B.2.d and
Parts II.B and C examine.
The EPA has recognized many of the advantages of a multimedia
approach to regulation, but changing its focus has been difficult because many agency staff and congressional leaders have a vested interest in single-medium programs. 57 The agency began studying
integrated environmental management in 1980,58 but its efforts to
adopt a more integrated approach were slowed during the middle
1980s by congressional adherence to single-medium approaches. 59 As
this section discusses, EPA has slowly started to shift from a singlemedium to a multimedia approach, but more needs to be done.
i. Cluster Rules, the Common Sense Initiative, and the GAO Report
In late 1993, EPA Administrator Carol Browner announced that
the agency would adopt a multimedia approach to rulemaking on a
comprehensive industry-by-industry basis to replace the existing approach of issuing a separate or even multiple rules for each medium. 60
The EPA quickly proposed a regulation that would have integrated
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act requirements for the pulp and
paper industry.61 This so-called "clustered"62 or multimedia rule pro56. See infra Part I.B.2.d (describing Project XL).
57. See infra Part I.C.3.
58. See Krier & Brownstein, supra note 22, at 130-31 (discussing EPA's Integrated
Environmental Management Project, created in 1980, and continuing agency interest in
integrated pollution control during the 1980s).
59. See infra Parts I.C.2 and I.C.3.
60. See Carol M. Browner, Address to the Chamber of Commerce Washington, D.C.
(Nov. 19,1993); AN ASSESSMENT OF EPA's REINVENTION, supra note 7, at 6.
61. See 58 Fed. Reg. 66,078 (Dec. 17, 1993).
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posed to take an "ecosystem-wide" approach to reduce and prevent
discharges of dioxin and other toxic pollutants. 63 Industry, however,
argued that the proposed rule was too costly while environmentalists
criticized the proposal because it did not totally eliminate the use of
chlorine, which is converted into dioxin when paper is bleached. 64
The difficulty of assessing the costs and the amount of dioxin that is
produced by various bleaching processes delayed EPA from issuing a
final cluster rule. 65
Even if existing statutes give EPA the authority to issue cluster
rules (which some disappointed party will likely challenge if the
agency ever issues such a rule), specific legislative authorization for
"cluster" rules would likely have encouraged the agency to move forward more quickly and given it the backbone to withstand both industry and environmentalist criticisms. While it is true that legislative
authorization would not eliminate difficult technical issues involving
the amount of dioxin produced by the industry and its possible health
impacts, legislation would likely have set a deadline for issuing a cluster rule and provided the agency with reassurance that a clustered or
multimedia approach is in fact legal.
In a major speech in 1994, EPA Administrator Carol Browner
announced a "Common Sense Initiative" designed to achieve
"cleaner, cheaper, smarter" environmental regulation that, rather
than taking the traditional approach of specifying the type of pollution
control technology industry must utilize,66 promised to give industry
more flexibility in achieving pollution reduction as long as it achieved
particular goals. A major focus of the Common Sense Initiative was
to develop multimedia regulation of industry sectors67 (initially
through pilot projects in six industry sectors68 ) and to replace so62. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency: New Rule-Making Process, "Clustered" Rules to
Come From EPA in Next Year, Official Says, 17 CHEM. REo. REp. (BNA) 1592 (Dec. 3,
1993) (reporting EPA official's explanation of concept of "clustered" or multimedia
rulemaking).
63. See Timothy Noah, EPA Seeks Strict Paper-Industry Rules Aimed at Cutting Dioxin, Air Pollution, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1993, at A24; see also Mank, Exception Process,
supra note 16, at 295.
64. See Noah, supra note 63, at A24.
65. See AN ASSESSMENT OF EPA's REINVENTION, supra note 7, at 6. On November
14, 1997, the EPA finally issued a combined water and air "cluster" rule for the pulp and
paper industry, which is the first multimedia rule to cover an entire industry. See Susan
Bruninga, Pulp-Paper Cluster Rule Seeks Cuts in Dioxin, Hazardous Air Pollutants, 28
Env't Rep. 1406, 1406-08 (BNA) (Nov. 21, 1997).
66. See Browner, supra note 60; Common Sense Initiative Council Federal Advisory
Committee: Establishment, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,117 (1994); Fiorino, supra note 21, at 470-71.
67. See Fiorino, supra note 21, at 471.
68. The six sectors include: 1) metal finishing and plating; 2) electronics and computers; 3) iron and steel; 4) auto assembly; 5) petroleum refining; and 6) printing. See
Fiorino, supra note 21, at 470; see also Multimedia: Ten Single-Permit Projects Allowed
Under Baucus Clean Water Act Amendment, 1994 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) 35 d4 (Feb. 23,
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called prescriptive "command-and-control" regulation. 69 Some industry sectors have achieved more success than others,7° but the program
arguably has failed to achieve the consensus required by the Federal
Advisory Committee Act process. 71 This program would also benefit
from specific legislative authorization that defines its goals, explicates
the extent to which multimedia regulation may replace existing requirements, and specifies when the agency may act if consensus is not
achieved within industry or among other stakeholders representing
environmental interests.
In 1994, Senator Max Baucus, then-Chair of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, proposed an amendment to a
Senate Clean Water Act bill that would have authorized EPA to issue
five-year "integrated permits" for air, water, and solid waste regulations at up to ten demonstration sites.72 Unfortunately, Congress
failed to enact any significant changes to the Clean Water Act that
year. Senator Baucus, however, subsequently requested that the
General Accounting Office (GAO) review experimental multimedia
regulatory approaches in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York.
In a 1996 report, the GAO concluded that because these state efforts
show promise in both reducing industry costs and reducing the total
amount of pollution released to all media, the agency should consider
allocating greater funds to state multimedia programs. 73 The GAO
report demonstrates that Congress ought to enact legislation that at a
minimum would give EPA authority to issue experimental multimedia
permits to test the validity of this approach on a national scale.
1994) [hereinafter, Multimedia Projects] (reporting February 16, 1994 speech to United
States Chamber of Commerce by EPA Administrator Carol Browner on Feb. 16, 1994).
69. See Fiorino, supra note 21, at 471.
70. In June 1996, the State of Michigan withdrew from the Common Sense Initiative's
automobile manufacturing subcommittee, even though about half the country's automobile
manufacturing facilities are located in that state, because the Director of the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality was dissatisfied with the ability of participants to
achieve consensus about how to find better environmental solutions. See AN ASSESSMENT
OF EPA's REINVENTION, supra note 7, at 7 n.47 (citing Letter to Carol Browner from
Russell J. Harding, Director of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (June
21, 1996». Cf Susan Bruninga, Regulatory Reform: EPA Reinvention Effort Falls Short
Report Says; Agency Decries Findings, 181 DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) A-13 (Sept. 18, 1996)
[hereinafter Agency Decries Findings] (finding that the metal finishing sector committee
announced in September 1996 that consensus had been achieved among environmentalists,
industry, and other interested parties on a procedure for setting goals).
71. See AN ASSESSMENT OF EPA's REINVENTION, supra note 7, at 6-7; see also Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.c. App. §§ 1-15.
72. See Multimedia Projects, supra note 68, at 68; General Policy: Baucus Soon to
Introduce Bill to Set Up Pilot MultiMedia Programs, 17 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1709 (Jan.
7, 1994).
73. See GAO, INTEGRATED ApPROACH, supra note 31, at 16; Regulatory Reform:
State Integrated Regulatory Approaches Have Promise, Funding Problems, GAO Says, 1996
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) 25 d17 (Feb. 7, 1996).
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ii. The Environmental Leadership Program
In January 1993, EPA published in the Federal Register a notice
of its intention to establish an experimental Environmental Leadership Program (ELP). The ELP would reward firms that achieved various pollution reduction goals and criteria by reducing monitoring or
reporting requirements. It would also provide some leniency in enforcement by encouraging multimedia permitting, use of regulatory
credits to compensate for voluntary efforts that exceed mandatory
pollution goals, and establishment of a special opportunity to consult
with an agency ombudsman who might be able to reduce unnecessary
administrative burdens.14 However, competitors that do not receive
this special treatment are likely to complain about favoritism or even
file suit alleging that EPA has violated existing statutes by exempting
a leadership firm from certain requirements. Therefore, this program
would be more successful if Congress provided specific legislative authorization and defined the parameters for the requirements EPA may
waive if a firm proves to be an "environmental leader." While such
legislation would not eliminate the possibility that some firms that are
not selected by the agency will charge that EPA is playing favorites
with their competitors, such legislation would provide a benchmark
for the GAO, Congress, and the public to determine whether EPA is
properly selecting environmental leaders for the program and to what
extent the agency may provide exemptions from existing
requirements.
iii. Permits Improvement Team (PIT)
In 1994, EPA created a Permits Improvement Team (PIT), composed of agency, state, local, and tribal permitting officials, to evaluate
the agency's permitting programs, including both those the agency had
delegated to those government entities and those the agency directly
administered. 75 In 1996, the PIT issued a Concept Paper and Task
Force recommendations in the Federal Register that announced that
the Team was considering the establishment of "public performancebased permitting" as a way of easing industry's permit obligations, and
74. See Request for Environmental Leadership Program Pilot Project Proposals, 58
Fed. Reg. 4802, 4811-12 (1993). Since 1982, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) has selected companies with low injury and accident rates that meet other
requirements to participate in a "Star" program that rewards these firms by allowing them
to largely self-monitor and to be subject to triennial inspections rather than annual compliance inl>pectionl>. See Notice of Changel> to the Voluntary Protection Programl>, 50 Fed.
Reg. 43,804, 43,812-13, 43,816 (1985); Notice of Implementation of Revised Voluntary Protection Programs, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,025,29,027-28 (1982).
75. See Notice of Availability of Permits Improvement Team Concept Paper on Environmental Permitting and Task Force Recommendations, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,856 (1996) [hereinafter PIT Concept Paper].
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was inviting informal public discussion of the recommendations.76 After making any changes based upon additional public comments, the
PIT will submit a final report to EPA Administrator Carol Browner
for her consideration. She, in turn, has the authority to adopt the recommendations as official agency policy.77
The PIT's recommendations bolster the emerging consensus
about the potential advantages of regulatory reform and multimedia
permits, but also raise serious questions about whether EPA can implement all of the recommendations without specific legislative authorization. Because the goal of permits should be to achieve ambient
environmental goals rather than simply meeting technology- or management-specific standards,7B the paper recommends that EPA: 1) allow firms to make a wide range of physical and operational changes
without triggering the need for a new or modified permit if a firm can
achieve less overall pollution than under existing mandates;79 2) allow
itself, as well as state, local, or tribal agencies, to focus monitoring and
reporting requirements on the most serious issues; and 3) reduce the
paperwork burden on less important activities. Bo To safeguard the
public from any harm from its recommendations for operational flexibility and more selective agency monitoring, the paper also recommended that EPA seek to incorporate more meaningful public
76. See id. "Public Performance-Based Permitting" Considered by EPA to Ease Industry's Burden, 27 ENV'T REp. (BNA) 270, 270 (May 17, 1996) [hereinafter "Public Performance-Based Permitting"].
77. See PIT Concept Paper, supra note 75, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,856; "Public Performance-Based Permitting" supra note 76, at 270. In recent years, the EPA and other agencies
have often adopted official agency policies in "guidance documents" or other informal policy announcements rather than through public notice-and-comment rulemaking under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. There has been considerable controversy
about how binding guidance documents are compared to duly promulgated rules, but that
issue is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Robert A. Anthony & David A.
Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A Harder Look at Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 667 (1996) (proposing courts review agency policy statements under demanding
standards used to review interpretive rules); Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy
Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind
the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992) (discussing agency policy statements and arguing
that they should not be treated the same as duly promulgated rules).
78. See PIT Concept Paper, supra note 75, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,860-61 (EPA will, as a
matter of first preference, attempt to set performance standards based upon ambient environmental goals; as a second choice, the agency will use performance standards based upon
technological achievability as the primary criterion; and, finally, the agency will, as a last
resort, use technology- or management-specific standards if it is infeasible to use performance-based measures).
79. See PIT Concept Paper, supra note 75, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,863-64; "Public Performance-Based Permitting", supra note 76, at 270.
80. See PIT Concept Paper, supra note 75, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,863-64; "Public Performance-Based Permitting", supra note 76, at 270. The fourth task force recommendation was
to "establish computer systems" and the fifth was to provide assistance to regional permit
processes. See PIT Concept Paper, supra note 75, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,864-65.
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participation in the permit process, including such incorporation into
the development and implementation of alternative and multimedia
permit approaches. 81 Because the PIT included a diverse group of
federal, state, local, and tribal permitting officials, it is significant that
they came to the same conclusions about operational flexibility and a
more performance- and goal-based system of monitoring that many in
industry, academe, and even environmental groups had been
recommending.
While EPA can seek to improve public participation in permit
decisions without additional legislative approval, many of the PIT's
recommendations about multimedia permits, the modification of permits, and the relaxation of at least some reporting requirements raise
questions about EPA's legal authority to implement them. The fact
that the PIT task force called for significant changes in the permitting
system demonstrates that Congress needs to reexamine existing statutory permit requirements and consider modifying them in light of the
paper's recommendations. In short, a fundamental change in something so basic as the permit system demands legislative attention and
action.
IV.

States and Performance Partnerships

The EPA needs to redefine its relationship with the states and
tribes (which implement a significant proportion of federal environmental mandates) because existing statutes and regulations give state
and tribal permitting agencies little flexibility to modify programs to
fit local conditions. 82 The challenge is to go beyond the existing federal-state/tribal relationship, which has emphasized simplistic measurements such as "bean counting" the total number of state or tribal
inspections or permits. 83 If EPA is to redefine its relationship with
states and tribes, however, Congress needs to provide legislative guidance about the degree to which local entities may depart from national norms.
81. See PIT Concept Paper, supra note 75, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,871-73; "Public Performance-Based Permitting", supra note 76, at 270.
82. See EPA: Ruckelshaus to Head Effort on New Agency Statutory Mission, Daily
Env't Rep. (BNA) 41 d9 (Mar. 1, 1996) [hereinafter New Agency Statutory Mission]; but
see Victor Byers Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the
Clean Water Act, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1 (1997) (arguing that state enforcement of
Clean Water Act NPDES permits varies significantly from state to state). There is not
necessarily an inconsistency between those that argue that federal environmental laws provide states with little flexibility and those who point out that states vary greatly in how they
implement those laws. A better environmental regime would give states more flexibility in
what regulatory approaches they may use, while requiring that states meet strict performance goals.
83. See New Agency Statutory Mission, supra note 82, at 41 d9.
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On May 17, 1995, EPA signed an agreement with states to develop a new federal oversight system of state and tribal programs, the
National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS).84
Under this System, EPA is supposed to grant far greater flexibility and
autonomy to state and tribal permitting authorities than ever before. 85
On August 19, 1996, EPA issued a revised interim guidance on when
the agency should issue performance partnership grants to state or tribal authorities. 86 A performance partnership grant is a mUlti-program
grant made to a state or a tribal agency from funds otherwise available
for categorical grant programs. It allows a state or tribe to combine
two or more of sixteen eligible grant programs into one or more performance partnership grants. 87 In theory, according to EPA, these
combined grants "will provide States and Tribes with flexibility to address their most pressing environmental priorities across all media and
establish resource allocations based on those priorities while continuing to address core program commitments."88 "As of April 1997, EPA
had signed performance partnership agreements with 27 states and environmental performance partnership grants with 21 states."89
Broader regulatory reform legislation is needed, however, to define
"core commitments" (minimum requirements that all states and tribes
must meet), the extent to which states may combine grant programs,
and the authority of local permitting agencies to authorize firms to
implement alternative compliance approaches. On October 29, 1997,
EPA issued a notice in the Federal Register requesting public comment on a draft agreement prepared jointly with the Environmental
Council of States establishing a framework for how the agency and the
states will promote and implement future regulatory innovation
efforts.90

84.
85.

See id.
See id.
86. See Performance Partnership Grants for State and Tribal Environmental Programs: Revised Interim Guidance, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,887 (1996) [hereinafter Performance
Partnership Grants].
87. See id.
88. [d. at 42,889.
89. GAO REpORT, supra note 9, at 26. On June 3, 1997, EPA announced it had
reached performance partnership agreements with 23 states. See EPA, Administration Environmental Protection Reinvention Programs Heightened, Environmental News, EPA
97-R-88, available at 1997 WL 290320, *2 (June 3, 1997). The inconsistency between the
EPA and GAO figures may be due to different definitions of an agreement.
90. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Joint EPA/State Agreement on Pursuing Regulatory Innovation, 62 Fed. Reg. 56,182 (1997).
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Project XL: Its Promise and Problems (EPA's Plans for Project
XL)
Project XL's Promise
In 1995, EPA developed, and President Clinton endorsed, a

widely publicized initiative called Project XL to promote regulatory
flexibility. EPA promised to implement fifty pilot projects within two
years. 91 Of all EPA's reform initiatives, Project XL is the most ambitious and promises the greatest degree of change towards a more flexible system of environmental regulation. 92
Project XL seeks to use innovative permitting methods, particularly those emphasizing pollution prevention or multimedia emissions
averaging, to reduce compliance costs and to realize superior environmental performance compared to that achieved under existing laws. 93
Although Project XL involves four distinct initiatives,94 most attention
has focused upon the Project's "facilities" initiative's, which would
give large manufacturing facilities the flexibility to use site-specific alternative compliance plans and integrated multimedia permits as long
as they meet or exceed pollution goals negotiated with the agency and
interested stakeholders. 95 In particular, Project XL would likely replace limits on emissions to a specific medium with facility-wide
"caps" or "bubbles" that authorize a firm to trade emissions among
pollutants or media. 96 The Clinton Administration provided the following example:
91. See President William Clinton, Remarks on Project XL, at the Old Executive Office Building (Nov. 3, 1995) (visited Oct. 13, 1997) <hUp://www.npr.govllibrary/speeches/
2662.html>; Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (1995) [hereinafter XL Pilot Projects]. See generally Susan Bruninga & Allison Meyer, "Reinvention"
Top EPA Priority, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1889, 1889-90 (Feb. 2, 1996) (discussing Project
XL); William H. Freedman & Karen A. Caffee, EPA's Project XL: Regulatory Flexibility,
10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 59,59 (1996); Beth S. Ginsberg & Cynthia Cummis, EPA's
Project XL: A Paradigm for Promising Regulatory Reform, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
lnst.) 10,059, 10,061 (Feb. 1996); Marianne Lavelle, Bending the Rules, NAT'L L.J., June 10,
1996, at AI, A17; Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,527-29 & n.13.
92. See Fiorino, supra note 21, at 477.
93. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 2, at 35; Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 91, at
10,061. .
94. The four Project XL program areas are: 1) individual facilities; 2) industry-wide or
sector-based; 3) government agencies regulated by the EPA; and 4) community-based programs. See XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91 at 27,282-90. The community-based programs
are significantly different from the other three types. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL)
Pilot Projects: XL Community Pilot Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 55,569 (1995); Regulatory
Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects: Notice of Modificatlons to Project XL, 62 Fed. Reg.
19,872 (1997) [hereinafter XL Modification].
95. See Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 91, at 10,061; Steinzor, supra note 8, at
10,527-28.
96. See Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 91, at 10,061-62; Steinzor, supra note 8, at
10,528, 10,530-31 (discussing several Project XL proposals and raising questions about the
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[A] company may find that upgrading its wastewater treatment system
to meet Clean Water Act technology-based requirements would have
a negligible impact on water quality, and that it could achieve greater
overall environmental protection by redirecting its pollution control
efforts toward programs to minimize hazardous emissions from unregulated sources, to recycle hazardous wastes and to reduce the use of
toxic chemicals in the manufacturing process. 97

In 1995, EPA established eight criteria for selecting companies
for Project XL.98 First and probably most importantly, a company
must be able to "achieve environmental performance that is superior
to what would be achieved through compliance with current and reasonably anticipated future regulation."99 All Project XL agreements
also should include "[e]xplicit definitions and measures of 'cleaner results'" but establishing that baseline is likely to raise serious legal and
technical questions about when overall reductions in multimedia pollution justify waiving single-medium requirements. loo In addition, the
criteria require projects to achieve cost savings or reduce a company's
paperwork burden, and especially favor innovative, multimedia, or
pollution prevention projects. 101 Furthermore, these projects must
achieve significant support from stakeholders such as state agencies,
local communities, businesses, and environmental and other public interest groups.102 Finally, a project must be consistent with Executive
Order 12,898, requiring federal agencies to consider whether environmental regulations or actions disproportionately affect poor people or
racial minority groups, and may not shift a facility's risk burden to
endanger worker safety or subject anyone to "unjust or disproportionate environmental impacts."103 While EPA indicated that it would atappropriateness of "cross-pollutant trades within a facility-wide-or even broader-emissions 'cap."').
97. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 2, at 35.
98. See XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at 27,287; Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note
91, at 10,061.
99. XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at 27,287; see Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note
91, at 10,061.
100. XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at 27,287; see Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note
91, at 10,061-63.
101. See XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at 27,287; Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note
91, at 10,061; Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,528.
102. See XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at 27,287; Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note
91, at 10,061; Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,528.
103. See XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at 27,287; Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note
91, at 10,061; see generally Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) (requiring
federal agencies to consider whether environmental regulations or actions disproportionately affect poor people or racial minority groups); Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 334-44 (1995) (reviewing empirical evidence regarding whether environmental inequities exist concerning various racial minority groups and the poor) [hereinafter Mank, Risk-Based Representation].
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tempt to provide some guidance to sponsors about "acceptable
approaches" to meeting these eight criteria, the agency warned that it
"must retain the ultimate authority to select projects based on a qualitative consideration of these criteria."lo4
On April 23, 1997, EPA stated that, while it was retaining the
eight criteria, in the future the agency would emphasize three factors
as of paramount importance in deciding whether to approve an XL
proposal: first, whether the proposal would achieve superior environmental performance compared to existing requirements; second,
whether the type of regulatory flexibility methods proposed were appropriate and might serve as a model for other projects; and, third,
whether the proposal contained adequate opportunities for involvement by various stakeholders to "ensure that the projects garner
broad community support."lOS
Recognizing that there are a number of complex issues involving
the measurement of environmental results and the appropriate environmental baseline, EPA is conducting the Project on a trial basis.106
In its April 23, 1997 Notice of Modification, EPA tried to provide
greater clarity about what constitutes superior environmental performance and which types of projects that increase regulatory flexibility would likely win approval. The agency has established a two-tiered
approach to assessing superior environmental performance that examines both quantitative and qualitative factors, which Part II.B.3.a examines in more detail. 107 The agency invited proposals that provide
incentives for pollution prevention, especially approaches that minimize the generation of persistent, bio-accumulative, or toxic chemicals; source reduction, recycling, or on-site reuse of wastes; greater or
continuous collection of emissions data; facility-wide emissions limits
under the Clean Air Act that also include continuous emission reduction; enhanced systems for data collection on employee health and
exposure to environmental pollutants; regulatory mechanisms to encourage consideration of the environment through the entire life cycle
of a product; the incorporation of environmental stewardship into customer and supplier relationships; or a multi-media closed-loop process
for technology development. lOS Although each of the proposals reflects the individual circumstances of a particular facility, the proposals generally include at least one of the following elements: emissions
trading, facility emission caps, multimedia permitting, pollution pre-

104. See XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at 27,287.
105. See XL Modification, supra note 94.
106. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 2, at 35.
107. See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,873-75.
108. See id. supra note 94, at 19,873.
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vention, or the elimination of obsolete reporting and other
paperwork-intensive requirements. I09
Because Project XL is based on allowing facilities to employ alternative compliance strategies that may violate existing laws, EPA
has promised to provide enforcement relief as long as the affected
firm complies with the alternative methods it negotiates with EPA.1l0
The main mechanism for accomplishing Project XL agreements will
be "no action assurances" from EPA, which will stipulate that the
agency will not pursue an enforcement action against a participant if it
meets all terms of its Final Project Agreement with the agency.HI
As of October 17, 1997, EPA had approved four XL projects for
implementation, had essentially approved a fifth, had announced a
sixth agreement, and was developing several additional projects with
state and local governments, project sponsors, and stakeholders.11 2
On July 12, 1996, EPA announced that it had approved a Project XL
pilot project with Jack M. Berry Inc., a citrus juice processor in LaBelle, Florida, which is expected to result in a single multimedia operating permit.n 3 In November 1995, EPA reached a Project XL
agreement with Intel Corporation regarding its new facility in Chandler, Arizona.u 4 In January 1997, EPA signed an agreement with a
Weyerhaeuser Corporation facility in Oglethorpe, Georgia that exempts the facility from required hazardous air pollutant controls, as
well as reduces reporting and testing requirements, in exchange for an
alternative compliance plan that incorporates pollution prevention
techniques and seeks significant reductions in total emissions to air,
109. See Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 91, at 10,061-62; Steinzor, supra note 8, at
10,530-31.
110. See XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at 27,284, 27,287.
111. See Clarification of Project XL's Operating Principles, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assistance, U.S. EPA, to Tim Mohin, Intel Corporation 3 (Feb. 23,1996) (Letter from John Fogarty) (visited Oct. 13, 1997) <http://l99.223.29.233/xl_home/
xl_foges.html> [hereinafter Clarification of Project XL's Operating Principles]; Memorandum from Steven Herman, EPA Assistant Administrator for Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance 4-5 (Oct. 2, 1995)(titled "Operating Principles for Project XL Participants")(visited Oct. 13, 1997) <hUp:/Il99.223.29.233/xl_home/xl_oeca.html> [hereinafter Operating Principles for Project XL Participants]. However, there are serious
questions whether EPA can preclude a citizen suit if the agency plans to do nothing about a
statutory or regulatory violation. See infra notes 143-144 and accompanying text. In addition, even assuming full compliance by a Project XL participant, EPA has indicated that it
retains the ability to bring an enforcement action to force a participant to address unanticipated environmental problems that pose imminent hazards or unacceptable health threats.
See Clarification of Project XL's Operating Principles supra; Operating Principles for Project XL Participants supra; see also Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 91, at 10,063.
112. See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,873.
113. Florida Juice Maker First to Participate in EPA's Project XL, July 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 393059, West's Legal News.
114. See Mohin, supra note 41, at 10,347-51; Project XL: Intel to Sign Agreement for
"One-Stop" Permit, GREENWlRE, Nov. 19, 1996.
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water, and land.115 In October 1997, EPA announced a Final Project
Agreement with HADCO corporation. 116 Also in that month, EPA
announced a site-specific rule for Merck and Company's pharmaceutical facility in Stonewall, Virginia, which is tantamount to a final XL
agreement.1 17 Finally, again in October, EPA announced a final XL
agreement with OSi Specialties, Inc., a chemical company in Sisterville, West Virginia.1lB The EPA's goal is to set in motion roughly
fifty projects.1 19
u. Project XL's Problems
Project XL has great promise but it shares the same basic problem as other multimedia reform initiatives discussed in Part 1.B.2.clack of clear EPA authority. As a result, uncertainty has hindered the
development of the program. Uncertainty exists because existing statutory requirements and agency institutional arrangements are primarily based on a single-medium approach that at best ignores and at
worst forbids multimedia regulatory approaches. This uncertainty is
reflected in the widely circulated comment supposedly made by an
anonymous EPA employee that "if it isn't illegal, it isn't XL."120
Although EPA contends that current statutes allow reform in
many but not all circumstances, even the agency implicitly concedes
there is considerable ambiguity as to which statutes allow reform and
under what circumstances. 121 Because substantial uncertainty exists
about the authority of EPA to replace existing requirements with various regulatory flexibility projects, the probability of prolonged litigation will discourage many firms from participating in such
initiatives. 122 Only if EPA can offer greater certainty and minimize
115. See EPA, Regulatory Reinvention Pilot Projects: Notice of Availability of Weyerhaeuser Project XL Final Project Agreement, 62 Fed. Reg. 4760 (Jan. 31, 1997); Weyerhaeuser, EPA Set Project XL Pact to Reduce Water Pollution, Air Emissions, 27 Env't. Rep.
(BNA) 1932, 1932-33 (Jan. 24, 1997).
116. See EPA, Project XL Final Project Agreement for HAD CO Corporation, 62 Fed.
Reg. 52,334 (1997); see also EPA, Project XL Draft Final Project Agreement for HAD CO
Corporation, 62 Fed. Reg. 3508 (1997).
117. See generally EPA, Project XL Site-Specific Rulemaking for Merck & Co., Inc.
Stonewall Plant, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,622 (Oct. 8, 1997) (final rule); EPA, Site-Specific
Rulemaking for Merck & Co., Inc. Stonewall Plant, 62 Fed. Reg. 15,304 (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. Parts 52, 60, 264 & 265) (proposed Mar. 1997) [hereinafter Site-Specific
Rulemaking].
118. See EPA Regulatory Reinvention Pilot Projects: Notice of Signing of OSi Project
XL Final Project Agreement, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,637 (Oct. 27, 1997).
119. See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,873.
120. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,527 (citing What's Up With Project XL-Week of
3/11/96, Project XL Update).
121. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
122. See Camilla Day Buczek, EPA Moves to Cooperative Approach, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
14,1996, at C15 (observing that EPA's written XL agreements with industry will not necessarily shield them from citizen suits); Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 91, at 10,063 (same);
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the prospects for litigation are such programs likely to have a major
impact on reshaping the framework of environmental regulation.
The EPA has generally claimed that existing statutes are sufficiently flexible to accommodate its regulatory reform initiatives. In its
1995 Notice announcing the Project XL Pilot Projects, EPA acknowledged that "[i]n particular circumstances, [the agency] may consider
changes in underlying regulations or may seek changes in underlying
statutes."123 In 1996, the PIT Concept Paper, however, claimed that
some EPA programs, such as the Clean Water Act's National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permitting process, are already applying many of these public performance-based permitting principles,
and therefore may have fewer changes to make.124 Similarly, in 1996,
David Gardiner, Assistant Administrator, EPA Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation, suggested that performance-based approaches
such as those used in Project XL could often be made without further
amendments to existing environmental statutes. 125 What Gardiner
and the concept paper ignore is the fact that many existing statutes do
not appear to allow performance-based standards or multimedia approaches to be substituted for existing technology-based standards or
single-medium requirements. 126 In fact, many environmentalists and
EPA staff have opposed the agency's regulatory reform initiatives precisely because they believe such proposals violate regulations and statutory requirements that EPA does not have the authority to waive. 127
In particular, firms may seek to waive existing statutory or regulatory
requirements that mandate the use of best available technology, a
specified percentage reduction in the amount of pollution, pollution
monitoring, or reporting requirements.
In its April 23, 1997 Notice of Modification, EPA acknowledges
that "[s]pecific statutory provisions may limit the scope of flexibility
available to certain XL projects."128 However, the agency contends
that "[t]o date ... this concern generally has not been a real barrier to
implementation of projects that meet the XL decision criteria."129
Nevertheless, EPA strongly encourages applicants to examine "the
full range of discretion available under the combination of existing

(

Lavelle, supra note 91 at A17 (noting EPA's argument that firms complying with Project
XL requirements are no longer liable for certain other former mandates).
123. See XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at 27,287.
124. See PIT Concept Paper, supra note 75, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,856.
125. See AN ASSESS~ENT OF EPA's REINVENTION, supra note 7, at 8 n.52.
126. See AN ASSESSMENT OF EPA's REINVENTION, supra note 7, at 10-12.
127. See, e.g., Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,527-37; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 9,
at 32 ("EPA has had difficulty achieving 'buy-in' among the agency's rank and file, which
have grown accustomed to prescriptive, medium-by-medium regulation during the
agency's 27-year history.").
128. XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,876.
129. Id.
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federal and state regulatory and statutory mechanisms," including various variance and waiver procedures, the possibility of flexible interpretations of current requirements, the modification of existing
permits or the issuance of new permits to allow greater flexibility.l3O
If existing procedures are inadequate, EPA will consider the possibility of site-specific notice-and-comment rule making to modify requirements that prevent the implementation of an applicant's proposal as
long as specific statutory provisions do not limit the authority of the
agency or states to promulgate such site-specific rules.13 1
Whether the agency has the flexibility under a particular statute
to adopt a Project XL agreement incorporating alternative compliance strategies can only be decided on a case by case basis. l32 If a
statute is ambiguous, courts will generally give the agency the benefit
of the doubt. In Chevron u.s.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Supreme Court established the principle that courts
should defer to an agency's "permissible" construction of an ambiguous statute. l33 Accordingly, courts may defer to EPA if the agency
contends that a statute allows, or at least does not prohibit, an alternative compliance strategy adopted as part of a regulatory flexibility
program.
On the other hand, even under Chevron, a court must reject a
policy that is more efficient or otherwise praiseworthy if a judge determines that the applicable statute clearly precludes the agency's interpretation. l34 Where a statute requires the use of a particular
technology or the use of the best available pollution control technology for an industry, EPA may have a difficult task in convincing a
court that it is legal for the agency to waive such requirements where a
firm achieves greater than mandated reductions in another medium.1 35 If an alternative compliance strategy, however, achieves
equivalent results in the same medium as the best available technology, then the agency would have a stronger case for arguing that deference is appropriate.
EPA may also have discretion to decide whether to enforce certain statutory requirements where the agency believes a company is
meeting substantially equivalent alternative compliance requirements
130. Id.
131. See id. at 19,876-77; see generally, site-specific Rulemaking, supra note 117.
132. See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,876.
133. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 865-66; see Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to
Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is
Better Than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231, 1242 (1996) {hereinafter
Mank, Textualist Interpretation].
134. See 467 U.S. at 842-43, 865-66; see also Mank, Textualist Interpretation, supra note
133, at 1244, 1250.
135. See supra notes 134-135.
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under a Project XL agreement. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme
Court indicated that agency applications of prosecutorial discretion
are generally unsuitable for judicial review in part because the agency
often must consider issues uniquely within its expertise. 136 The Court
declared that a presumption of unreviewability exists if a plaintiff
challenges an agency's failure to bring a prosecution. This presumption may be rebutted either by the existence of a mandatory statutory
duty to act in circumstances that a reviewing court is capable of defining or where the agency has imposed such a duty on itself in a legislative rule.137 Heckler's generally broad protection of prosecutorial
discretion and deferential attitude toward agency expertise may provide authority for EPA to take no enforcement action against a firm
that enters into an agreement to use alternative compliance methods.
But despite Heckler, some commentators believe that EPA's exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be reviewable where there is no
explicit statutory language authorizing EPA to use alternative compliance methods, such as those in Project XL, because the agency can
only exercise that authority granted to it pursuant to specific statutory
directives.13 8 Assuming Heckler applies, there is a presumption that
EPA's no-action agreements are nonreviewable, but there is the possibility that a court in a particular case may overcome that presumption
by concluding that a statutory or regulatory duty compels EPA to take
enforcement action.
Furthermore, even if EPA has the enforcement discretion not to
prosecute firms involved in regulatory flexibility initiatives, environmentalists, other interested nongovernmental groups, and competitors
who are not part of these initiatives, may use the citizen suit provisions found in most environmental statutes to challenge any attempt
by EPA to bend or waive rules for participating firms.13 9 Although
the Supreme Court has implied that a person filing such a suit must
meet standing requirements, such as personal injury-in-fact,14o it is
136. See 470 U.S. 821,831-32; RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS 323 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter PIERCE]; see also Arnow v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 868 F.2d 223, 235-36 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying Heckler v.
Chaney to an NRC enforcement decision). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency
Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1985) (criticizing Heckler v.
Chaney).
137. See PIERCE, supra note 136, at 323.
138. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,535-36.
139. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.c. § 7604 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.c. § 300j-8 (1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); see Fiorino,
supra note 21, at 480-81; Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 91, at 10,063-64; Steinzor, supra
note 8, at 10,535-36.
140. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 571-78 (1992) (requiring citizen to demonstrate some type of concrete and particularized "injury in fact" to
obtain standing and rejecting view that citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes can
confer standing upon persons without such injury); see also id. at 579-81 (Kennedy, J.,
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 27 1998-1999

28

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 25:1

generally easy for a citizen who is affected by a firm's pollution to
meet threshold standing requirements-even aesthetic injuries may be
enough. 141 Recently, in Bennett v. Spear, the Supreme Court held that
the "zone of interests" test for restricting standing to those with a legitimate interest in a statute's goals does not apply to citizen suit statutes authorizing "any person" to challenge an act or omission by an
agency.142 Even if some persons or firms lack standing, there are
likely to be a significant number who possess standing to bring a citizen suit challenging a Project XL or other regulatory flexibility
agreement.
It is possible, but unlikely, that "no enforcement" agreements bar
a citizen suit. Environmental statutes usually preclude citizen suits
when the appropriate state or federal agency is diligently prosecuting
an action to enforce the standards, although any person may intervene
as a matter of right. 143 If an agency simply issues an administrative
order, however, the courts have generally held that such an order
without more, such as a requirement that the violator pay civil penalties comparable to the applicable federal penalty provision, is not the
equivalent of "a civil or criminal action in a court of the United
States." Accordingly, such orders do not bar citizen suits.l44
However, a consent decree, if approved by a court, will bar a citizen suit on issues controlled by its terms.145 It is unlikely that EPA
concurring in part and concurring in the jUdgment) (arguing some type of concrete injury is
needed for standing, but maintaining that "Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation tbat will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before .... ").
141. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
142. 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1161-63 (1997) (rev'g Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.
1995».
143. See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 7604(b)(I)(B); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil Co.,
83 F.3d 1111, 1115-18 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing when diligent state or federal enforcement
action bars a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act); Steven Russo, States, Citizens, and
the Clean Water Act: State Administrative Enforcement and the Diligent Prosecution Defense, 4 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 211, 231 (1995).
144. See Citizens, 83 F.3d at 1116-18 (holding state penalty assessment was not comparable to federal penalty provision under Clean Water Act and therefore did not bar citizen
suit); Washington Public Interest Research Group (WASHPIRG) v. Pendleton Woolen
Mills, 11 F.3d 883, 885-86 (9tb Cir. 1993) (holding that EPA administrative compliance
order requiring the defendant to prepare a report identifying ways for it to achieve compliance did not bar citizen suit under Clean Water Act because order did not seek monetary
penalties); Proffitt v. Commissioners of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 1985); Student
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Fritsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759
F.2d 1131, 1136-39 (3d Cir. 1985). An administrative consent order that requires monetary
penalties may in some circumstances bar a citizen suit. See, e.g., Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v.
ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 383 (8th Cir. 1994); JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS O. McGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEGnON 880 (2d ed. 1992).
145. See EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 1403-05 (8th Cir. 1990); Student
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp.
1419, 1431-32 (D. N.J. 1985); BONINE & MCGARITY, supra note 144, at 880.
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would want to pursue the lengthy consent decree process for every
regulatory flexibility agreement it enters with industry. Therefore, it
is likely that "no enforcement action" agreements between firms and
the agency will be vulnerable to citizen suits. 146 The EPA might reduce, but not totally eliminate, the possibility of such lawsuits by securing the approval and support of all stakeholders,147 but EPA's
Common Sense Initiative demonstrates the difficulty of achieving such
consensus. 148
Even assuming a participant fully complies with a Project XL
agreement, the existence of such an agreement is unlikely to shield a
participant from liability altogether. Although the presence of a Project XL agreement might lead a court to reduce substantially a fine or
to waive certain injunctive requirements,149 prospective applicants
nonetheless may decide not to pursue the lengthy Project XL process
if they are uncertain about the extent to which an agreement with
EPA will shield them from liability.
An example of such litigation is a suit challenging the use of emissions trading to allow companies to avoid existing regulatory requirements-which is exactly the type of program Project XL seeks to
encourage. In late July 1997, local environmental justice groups and
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund filed a civil rights suit-the first of
its kind-against the regional South Coast Air Quality Management
District and California Air Resources Board. The suit challenged an
air pollution trading scheme in which oil companies, including Chevron Corp., Unocal Corp., Tosco Corp., Ultramar Corp., and GATX
Corp. were relieved from cleaning up emissions of 590 tons of hydrocarbons, which are volatile organic compounds (VOCs), from certain
terminals in Los Angeles, California. In exchange, the companies
agreed to buy and remove more than 7,400 older, high-pollution cars,
at a cost of approximately $600 a piece, from area highways.15o
While declining to formally comment on the suit, the oil companies argue that the program produces great benefits for all fourteen
million people living in Southern California, and only minor, insignificant risks for residents living near the refineries.1 51 The plaintiffs al146. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,536.
147. See Liability Concerns, Regulatory Uncertainty Impede Innovation, White House
Official Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1246 (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter White House Official
Says] (reporting remarks at Sept. 25, 1996 forum by David Rejeski, spokesman for the
White House Office of Science and Technology); Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 91, at
10,063; Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,536.
148. See supra Part I.B.2.c.i.
149. See Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 91, at 10,063.
150. See Marla Cone, Civil Rights Suit Attacks Trade in Pollution Credits, L.A. TIMES,
July 23,1997, at AI; Robert Stevens, Civil Rights Laws Are Cited in Challenge to California
Poliution·Control Tactics, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1997, at B10.
151. See Cone, supra note 150, at A1.
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lege that the emissions-trading initiatives approved by regional and
state air pollution control officials violate Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance
from engaging in discrimination. 152 The complaint alleges that certain
minority communities are selectively subjected to disproportionately
high amounts, so-called "hot spots," of harmful chemicals. 153 While
the regional district has a separate rule limiting "hot spots" to a maximum risk of 100 cases of cancer per million people exposed, many feel
that standard may be inadequate for health concerns. 154 The suit asks
EPA to rescind the program and to withdraw all federal funding from
the Air Quality Management District.1 55 The EPA stated that it took
the suit seriously, but did not announce what action or position it
would take. 156
This suit raises serious questions about many Project XL proposals, which often involve innovative trading or emissions caps schemes.
The suit also raises serious questions about hundreds of other trading
programs in Southern California, a similar strategy in Michigan, and
many proposed programs in other states. 157
C.

The Need for Legislation: Impediments to Reform

Project XL and similar multimedia reform initiatives possess
great promise, but EPA finds itself constrained by an unclear allocation of authority. In terms of Project XL, the unclear allocation of
authority is due mostly to statutory limitations on the regulatory
methods that EPA may employ. As the next section illustrates, the
inherent nature of the statutory scheme not only impedes reform of
Project XL but of environmental regulation generally. Even where a
statute arguably allows for some of the proposed reforms, litigation by
disgruntled parties will bog the entire process down. Further, two
other important factors impede reform as well-Congress' fragmented committee structure and EPA's single-medium oriented admInIstrative structure. Existing institutional arrangements and
statutory requirements empower those who prefer the present singlemedium system of pollution control and raise serious legal questions
about multimedia reform efforts. Elimination of these impediments
would require comprehensive regulatory reform authorizing a holistic,
multi-media approach.
152. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53,
42 U.S.c. § 2000d (1994); Mank, Risk-Based Representation, supra note 103, at 383-86 (discussing application of Title VI to environmental justice suits).
153. See Cone, supra note 150, at AI; Stevens, supra note 150, at B1O.
154. See Cone, supra note 150, at AI; Stevens, supra note 150, at BID.
155. See Cone, supra note 150, at Al.
156. See id.; Stevens, supra note 150, at B1O.
157. See Cone, supra note 150, at Al.
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Statutory Limitations on Regulatory Methods

Congress has often limited the ability of EPA to readjust either
priorities or remedies by imposing narrow statutory commands and,
accordingly, has excluded methods that might be more efficient,158
During the 1970s, when national pollution control regulation was new,
the legislature tended to set highly rigid and often unrealistic goals for
EPA and frequently specified the use of technology-based pollution
control methods. 159 For instance, section 101(a) of the 1972 Clean
Water Act required zero water pollution by 1985-this anachronistic
provision is still part of the statute. 160 Multimedia reform efforts require that Congress, as well as EPA officials still committed to traditional single-medium regulation, recognize that some minimum level
of water pollution may be necessary to avoid greater harm to the land
or au.
In addition, section 112 of the 1970 Clean Air Act required EPA
to establish air quality standards for hazardous air pollutants that provided an "ample margin of safety."161 Because of scientific uncertainties about the risks of carcinogens, the statute provided EPA with no
realistic guidance about how to achieve the statutory goal short of an
unrealistic ban on numerous chemicals that would have shut down
major sections of American industry-a result that was politically infeasible for EPA to command. 162 Such an unrealistic goal impedes
reform by, for instance, preventing EPA from tolerating a minor increase in hazardous air emissions if there is a corresponding or greater
decrease in other environmental risks. Unrealistic statutory commands also helped to create a culture within EPA that focuses on
meeting bureaucratic requirements rather than experimenting with
regulatory alternatives that might be more effective, yet more contro158. For example, EPA has only limited power to regulate indoor air pollution even
though the agency believes that such pollution poses a higher health risk than many other
hazards it regulates. Richard N.L. Andrews, Long-Range Planning in Environmental and
Health Regulatory Agencies, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 532-33 (1993).
159. See generally Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 38, at 1335-39 (observing that Congress during the 1970s often specified technOlogy-based pollution controls in environmental legislation and arguing that subsequent experience has shown these "Best Available
Technology" based controls to be inefficient and disproportionately detrimental).
160. See 33 U.S.c. § 1251(a)(I). The statute, however, undermined the whole zero discharge premise by establishing a system in which a polluter may discharge as long as it
holds a permit. See 33 U.S.c. § 1342; Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 479, 523 n.272 (1995).
161. 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2).
162. See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(b)(I)(B); John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 237-41, 255 & (1990); Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16,
at 267-70.
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versial for individual agency employees who have to think about their
careers. 163
Prescriptive "command-and-control" statutes also hinder reform
efforts by imposing mandatory conditions that a firm must meet even
if the firm could present an alternative strategy that would achieve the
same or lower pollution at less cost but does not meet the specified
requirements. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Congresses controlled by the Democratic Party arguably made statutes more prescriptive, perhaps as a way to block the deregulatory efforts of the
Republican Reagan and Bush Administrations. Such statutes include
the Hazardous Waste and Disposal Act of 1984,164 the Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1986,165 and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. 166
Some commentators refer to these types of regulation as "commandand-control" regulation 167 because of their detailed requirements
about which chemicals an agency must regulate, how the agency must
regulate them, and when the agency must promulgate regulations. 168
As a result, these statutes strongly inhibit or clearly preclude the
agency from adopting different regulatory strategies and obstruct
agency employees who favor multimedia reform. 169
Other environmental statutes constrain agency behavior by precluding the use of alternative regulatory methods. For example, the
Clean Water Act requires EPA to issue permits to all point sources
discharging into the nation's navigable waters. 170 Instead of mandating permits, however, Congress could have provided EPA with freedom to choose alternative pollution control strategies such as
pollution taxes, limitations on the use of specified waste-creating feed-

163. See infra note 166.
Pub. L. No. 98-616, 96 Stat. 3221.
The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 V.S.c. § 300j-8 (1994).
166. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399;
STEPHEN J. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1992) (criticizing Congress for setting unrealistic goals and mandating overly specific requirements in environmental statutes); Fiorino, supra note 21, at 480
("Environmental laws-especially those reauthorized by the largely pro-regulatory Congresses of the 1980s--contain many specific regulatory requirements."); Michael Herz, Ju164.
165.

dicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A Potential Collision in Clean
Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 175-82 (1992) (arguing that Congress
has enacted overly specific environmental statutes, especially the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments).
167. See, e.g., Fiorino, supra note 21, at 463-64 (citing sources).
168. See id. at 480.
169. See 42 V.S.c. § 7470 (Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program set forth in
Title I, Part C of the Clean Air Act); A. STANLEY MEIBURG, PROTECT AND ENHANCE:
"JURIDICAL DEMOCRACY" AND THE PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION OF
AIR QUALITY (1991).
170. See 33 V.S.c. § 1342; Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 521.
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stock materials, or mandatory recycling or pretreatment of waste
products. 171
Even a statute that appears to give an agency considerable discretion may foreclose the use of innovative alternatives. For instance,
CERCLA establishes a general framework in which EPA must promulgate a national contingency plan for cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste sites. EPA must establish a hazard ranking system and
use that criteria to rank various facilities, respond to those sites, and
seek reimbursement for its cleanup from the responsible polluters. I72
Although CERCLA leaves most of the details to EPA, an examination of recent proposed legislation designed to reform the statute implicitly suggests that it would be inappropriate for the agency to
unilaterally adopt changes-such as taxing those who benefit from
waste-producing activities or changing remediation guidelines to make
remedial activities more sensitive to economic or technical feasibility,
or to location-because the authors of the bills assumed that the
agency could not simply adopt these reforms. 173 Indeed, in Kelley v.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,174 the D.C. Circuit struck
down an EPA rule regarding the CERCLA liability of banks as beyond the agency's statutory authority and concluded that section 107
of the statute did not give the agency rule making authority over the
scope of the statute's liability provisions, but instead left the courts
with authority to define CERCLA's breadthP5
Furthermore, inclusion of prescriptive regulatory requirements in
a single-medium statute often implicitly or explicitly discourages the
use of a multimedia approach. For instance, a statutory or regulatory
requirement that a plant upgrade its wastewater treatment to meet the
Clean Water Act's technology-based requirements may only marginally improve the quality of the receiving water, but the expense of
doing so may prevent the firm from voluntarily spending the same
amount of money to correct a more serious land disposal or air pollution problemP6 Some environmentalists appear to believe that the
way to solve multimedia problems is to make regulation of all media
171. See Carol A. Browner, The Common Sense Initiative: A New Generation of Environmental Protection (last modified June 21, 1996) <http://www.epa.gov/commonsense/
speech2.txt> (criticizing laws that tell "industry not only what standard to meet but also the
specific technology they halve] to use to meet it"); Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 52L
172. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 9604,9605,9606,9607 (1997); Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at
513.
173. See Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 514.
174. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
175. See id. at 1105-08; William W. Buzbee, CERCLA's New Safe Harbors for Banks,
Lenders, and Fiduciaries, 26 ENVTL. L. REp. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,656,10,658,10,661-62 (Dec.
1996).
176. See supra Part I.B.L
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more stringent. 177 However, in a world of limited resources, a rigid
and expensive prescriptive requirement in one medium may mean
that the company has less money to spend on more serious problems
in other media. 178 Most environmental statutes and regulations do
not recognize the value of alternative regulatory methods that might
allow greater reductions of pollution at less cost in the same or different mediaP9
Other unnecessarily rigid controls are the Best Available Technology (BAT) mandates that require EPA to set uniform technologybased pollution controls for an entire industry throughout the nation. 180 There is substantial evidence that uniform technology-based
statutory requirements are often inefficient for many individual firms,
are expensive for agencies to promulgate, discourage innovation, and
promote litigation about the details of the requirements. Despite this,
Congress has only slowly moved to allow some use of alternative incentive-based pollution control strategies. 181 Title IV of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments began to allow and even encourage market-based regulation with the sulfur dioxide allowance trading scheme
to control the creation of acid rain. 182 Nevertheless, the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments are premised on a medium-specific approach
and contain many highly prescriptive requirements, including traditional technology-based mandates.1 83
2.

Congress' Fragmented Environmental Committees

Congress' fragmented committee structure has often contributed
to a focus on a single medium 184 at the expense of looking at the impact on other media. There is some dispute about the exact number
of House and Senate committees and subcommittees with extensive
jurisdiction over EPA, but all commentators agree that the number is
high.1 85 Less fragmentation exists in the Senate because its Commit177. See generally infra Part II.B.
178. See generally supra Part LB.1.
179. See id.
180. See Ackerman & Stewart supra note 38, at 1335.
181. See id. supra note 38, at 1335-39, 1364-65.
182. See 42 U.S.c. § 7651-76510 (1997) (providing for sulfur dioxide allowance program); see also Fiorino, supra note 21, at 480.
183. See Fiorino, supra note 21, at 480; Herz, supra note 166, at 175-82.
184. See Fiorino, supra note 21, at 460-61.
185. Compare Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions
From an Empirical Study of EPA's Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projections, 53 MD.
L. REv. 521, 536 (1994) (currently, at \east 11 standing House and 9 standing Senate committees and as many as 100 of their subcommittees share jurisdiction over EPA); Richard J.
Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Jpsos
Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
205, 211 (1991) [hereinafter Congressional Oversight]; see also NAPA, supra note 35, at
124-25 (13 House and Senate committees and 31 subcommittees had actual oversight jurisHeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 34 1998-1999
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tee on the Environment and Public Works has responsibility over all
major environmental programs except for pesticides issues. 186 In the
House, there is much more fragmentation among environmental committees.1 87 There are five House Committees that oversee most EPA
and other environmental programs,188 with the Commerce Committee
covering the widest range of environmental programs. 189 In addition,
there is often overlapping jurisdiction among different House committees. 190 For instance, three committees share authority over groundwater issues. A fourth, Agriculture, has jurisdiction if groundwater
contamination by pesticides is implicated. 191 In both chambers, the
agriculture committees oversee pesticides policy and tend to favor
farmer and grower interests rather than the protection of the public
health. 192
In addition to the major environmental oversight committees,
several other committees have jurisdiction over broad issues that include the environment. 193 Most notably, the Senate and House appropriations committees control EPA's budget and, therefore, have an
enormous impact on what the agency can actually accomplish.
Because there are so many congressional committees with authority over at least some EPA programs, Congress frequently provides only divided and conflicting directions to the agency. In general,
both congressional policymaking and oversight of agency implementadiction during the 104th Congress) (Table 5.1); see also DANIEL J. FIORINO, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 64-66 (1995) (listing several House and Senate environmental
committees).
186. The Committee's jurisdiction is divided among four major subcommittees. FIORINO, supra note 185, at 64-66. In addition, the Water and Power Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources oversees groundwater policies, and
the Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee has jurisdiction over oceanic environmental issues. [d. at 65; NAPA,
supra note 35, at 124, 126.
187. FIORINO, supra note 185, at 65.
188. The five main House Committees include the: 1) Commerce; 2) Resources, which
in 1995 absorbed the environmental jurisdiction of the former Merchant Marine and Fisheries committee; 3) Transportation and Infrastructure; 4) Agriculture; and 5) Science committees. See generally David Hosansky, House Commerce Profile, 53 CONGo Q. WKLY.
REP., Jan. 7, 1995, at 37 (reporting jurisdiction of House Commerce Committee in 1995);
1995 Special Committees Report: House Resources, 53 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp., March 25,
1995, at 82-83 (reporting jurisdiction of House Resources Committee in 1995).
189. The House Energy and Commerce Committee has jurisdiction over air, toxic
chemicals, land waste disposal, drinking water, and groundwater. See FIORINO, supra note
185, at 65-66.
190. See id. at 65.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. For instance, the Senate Government Affairs and House Government Operations
committees would address specific issues within their jurisdiction that would include the
management of various EPA programs. See id.
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tion of policies are "fitful," unsystematic, and uneven. 194 The legislative process frequently involves compromise agreements to "split the
difference," leading to statutory gaps or inconsistencies, and statutes
often fail to anticipate many implementation issues.1 95 Because congressional environmental committees are especially fragmented (for
example, enacting one environmental statute at a time) and write statutes in different subcommittees with overlapping jurisdiction, Congress as an institution cannot easily coordinate potentially overlapping
provisions in different environmental statutes.196 Furthermore, the
excessive division of environmental committees' oversight jurisdiction
often results in poorly drafted laws. That division has also prevented
needed amendments of existing laws because each committee involved in the drafting process is frequently only interested in its piece
of the package rather than the good of the whole. 197 Even worse,
committee influence over agency policy may not reflect the desires of
the entire Congress, especially because members of Congress are
often assigned to particular committees if their district has a special
interest in the committee's subject matter. 198 Ironically, the House
and Senate appropriations committees, which have often been hostile
to increased EPA funding,199 are the only committees in Congress
with comprehensive jurisdiction over EPA. All of the authorizing environmental committees have only fragmented jurisdiction over the
agency and may not examine the performance of the agency as a
whole. 20o
While in 1995 House Speaker Newt Gingrich was able to adopt
some rules changes in the House of Representatives that enhance centralized control by House leaders over many substantive areas,201 he
and his conservative Republican colleagues failed to achieve passage
of major environmental deregulation bills that proposed to make both
194. See CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 171 (1988) ("Oversight is at
heart, then, a process of fitful policy adjustment."); Sidney A. Shapiro, Occupational Safety
and Health: Policy Options and Political Reality, 31 Hous. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (1994).
195. See Andrews, supra note 158, at 530.
196. See BREYER, supra note 166, at 42.
197. See Lazarus, Congressional Oversight, supra note 185, at 231; Richard J. Lazarus,
The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 AUT-LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 357 (1991).
198. See Lazarus, Tragedy of Distrust, supra note 197, at 357; Shapiro, supra note 193 at
15.
199. See Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding, Working Group Discussions, in WORST
THINGS FIRST 197 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994) [hereinafter WORST
THINGS FIRST]; Lazarus, Congressional Oversight, supra note 185, at 217-18, 230; Lazarus,
Tragedy of Distrust, supra note 197, at 323-30.
200. See NAPA, supra note 35, at 126.
201. See David S. Cloud, GOP, to Its Great Delight, Enacts House Rules Changes, 53
CONGo Q. WKLY. REP., Jan. 7, 1995, at 13-15.
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significant procedural and substantive changes to the environmental
policy area. Gingrich's efforts failed because in 1996 President Clinton won the battle for public support over these issues by attacking
Republicans for seeking to weaken most environmental programs and
Senate moderates often deserted conservatives in the House. 202
Furthermore, congressional oversight of EPA has often discouraged innovative reforms within the agency, such as agency efforts to
promote cross-media regulation during the mid-1980s.203 Congress is
not well-suited to formulate environmental policies or readjust environmental priorities to reflect new scientific information or evolving
policy goals. 204 Congressional oversight has tended to skew agency
priorities by forcing the agency to adjust its resources in response to
requests by various committees or subcommittees rather than through
systematic prioritization. 205 On the whole, Congress often uses the
oversight process to achieve short-term political goals or respond to
perceived crises by focusing on the "chemical of the month" rather
than to encourage broad or long-term review of statutes or programs. 206 In general, Congress may tend to have a short time horizon
because legislators are not only concerned with writing statutes, but
also with a whole host of political issues.
Hence, EPA's budget primarily reflects political factors and entrenched congressional interests rather than a careful assessment of
how money should be spent to achieve the greatest reduction in pollution. 207 In fiscal year 1990, more than seventy percent of EPA's $6
billion budget was spent on two programs: construction of wastewater
treatment plants-which are politically valuable sources of jobs as
well as environmentally useful-and cleanup of abandoned hazardous
waste sites under Superfund-a politically popular environmental issue that many experts believe is not as important a problem as other
environmental questions. 208 As a result, only five percent of EPA's
budget was available for discretionary spending, and the rest was com-

202. See Josh Connelly, GOP Mostly Thwarted on Environmental Issues, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 26, 1996, at AI.
203. Andrews, supra note 158, at 545; Lazarus, Congressional Oversight, supra note
185, at 229; Lazarus, Tragedy of Distrust, supra note 197, at 359.
204. See Andrews, supra note 158, at 530-3I.
205. Andrews, supra note 158, at 545; Lazarus, Congressional Oversight, supra note
185, at 230.
206. See WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 198, at 197; FIORINO, supra note 185, at 6869; Andrews, supra note 158, at 545; Shapiro, supra note 193, at 25-26.
207. See generally F. Henry Habicht II, EPA's Vision for Setting National Environmental Priorities, in WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 199, at 42-44.
208. See Habicht, supra note 207, at 42; Charles W. Kent & Frederick W. AlIen, An
Overview of Risk-Based Priority Setting at EPA, in WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 199,
at 58-60.
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mitted to specific programs or media issues. 209 Furthermore, whenever the agency wishes to shift money from one program to another,
EPA must obtain Congress' approval. This is a lengthy and difficult
process that discourages the agency from promptly responding to
changing circumstances and priorities. In addition, the short-term focus of the budget cycle hinders the ability of agencies to engage in
long-range planning. 210
In theory, Congress as a whole should coordinate the efforts of
different committees. However, as suggested above, Congress tends
to evaluate each committee's work on an ad hoc basis without examining its impact on other committees or legislation. Because it will be
difficult to remedy Congress's deeply fragmented institutional structure, the next best approach would be for Congress to authorize EPA
to make multimedia tradeoffs within certain legislatively defined limits that protect public health and the environment, and allow for
greater public participation in the permitting and regulatory
process. 211

3.

EPA's Single-Medium Organizational Structure

In addition to fragmentation of congressional committees, EPA's
own staff has often inhibited coherent and integrated agency decisionmaking. 212 The EPA's organizational structure encourages the media
offices to focus on the medium-specific statutes that created their programs and fosters tunnel vision about environmental issues, retarding
efforts at comparative risk assessment and priority-setting?13
In 1970, President Nixon created EPA by pulling together several
different, largely medium-specific programs. 214 The transition team
assigned to create EPA's organizational structure wanted to create an
agency integrated across media lines in the long run. However, the
team recognized that because EPA had inherited a host of separate
single-medium statutes, the agency had to be organized, at least initially, on a mostly medium-specific basis. 215 William Ruckelshaus,
EPA's first administrator, believed that it was more important for the
209. See Adam M. Finkel, Should We-and Can We-Reduce the Worst Risks First?, in
WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 199, at 11; Habicht, supra note 207, at 42.
210. See Andrews, supra note 158, at 541-43; Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A Proposal for a "Republican" Superagency,S N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 444, 474-75 (1996).
211. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
212. See NAPA, supra note 35, at 126-27.
213. See id. at 127; GAO REpORT, supra note 9, at 16-17.
214. See NAPA, supra note 35, at 15; Krier & Brownstein, supra note 22; Alfred A.
Marcus, EPA's Organizational Structure, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 5,
9-21.
215. See Krier & Brownstein, supra note 22, at 121; Marcus, supra note 214, at 22-30,
32.
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agency to take action against pollution than to become mired in political battles about the agency's organization. 216 In the end, Ruckelshaus and the other high-level administrators in the early EPA created
an agency that was partly integrated across functional lines and partly
driven by medium-specific issues. 217
By 1971, EPA had established functional offices for planning, research and enforcement, but also had created separate Assistant Administrators for Media Programs, such as Air and Water, and for
Categorical Programs such as Pesticides, Radiation, and Solid
Waste. 218 EPA's attempt to create only two program offices failed as a
result of the medium-specific nature of environmental statutes. 219 For
instance, EPA first placed both its large water and air programs under
a single assistant administrator, but eventually divided these media
programs into two offices with separate assistant administrators because their statutory mandates were sufficiently different.2 2o While
five of EPA's nine Assistant Administrators have functional responsibilities cutting across programmatic lines,221 the agency's four Assistant Administrators with programmatic responsibilities still largely
focus on a single-medium, and their program offices disproportionately influence the agency's culture toward single-medium thinking. 222
The four major program offices are responsible for developing
rules, which most frequently are issued in response to a specific statutory command. 223 Normally, one of the four program offices acts as
the lead office in developing a particular rule, and traditionally EPA's
separate single-medium offices have thought little about the impacts
of their regulations on other media programs. 224 Over the years, EPA
has sought, with varying degrees of success, to increase the participation of other program and functional offices in the lead office's deci216. See Krier & Brownstein, supra note 22, at 121; Marcus, supra note 214, at 22-30.
217. See NAPA, supra note 35, at 15; Krier & Brownstein, supra note 22, at 121; Marcus, supra note 214, at 22-23, 29.
218. See NAPA, supra note 35, at 15; Marcus, supra note 214, at 29.
219. See NAPA, supra note 35, at 15-17; Marcus, supra note 214, at 32-33.
220. Marcus, supra note 214, at 32.
221. The Assistant Administrators with cross program responsibilities are: Administration and Resource Management; Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring; International Activities; Policy, Planning, and Evaluation; and Research and Development. See
NAPA, supra note 35, at 16-17; Thomas O. McGarity, Assessing the Environmental Protection Agency After Twenty Years: Law, Politics, and Economics: The Internal Structure of
EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 57, 65-67 [hereinafter
McGarity, Internal Structure].
222. The Assistant Administrators for Air and Radiation, for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, and for Water largely focus on a single medium; the Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances has a somewhat broader scope of authority. See
NAPA, supra note 35, at 16-17; McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 221, at 65-66.
223. See McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 221, at 70.
224. See id. at 70, 85-86.
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sionmaking and rulemaking processes. 225 Since the late 1980s, EPA
has made a concerted attempt to increase consideration of the crossmedia aspects of pollution and pollution control technologies, but the
agency is far from creating a truly multimedia approach to
regula tion. 226
The single-medium focus in EPA is difficult to change because
this emphasis runs from the congressional authorizing committees to
the assistant administrators who direct media offices and then to media office staff members.227 Many EPA career managers have a close
relationship with congressional committee and subcommittee staff,
and both EPA and congressional staff are often more concerned with
the specific medium statute within their jurisdiction than with improving the agency's overall priorities. 228 Too often agency staff and managers are preoccupied with short-term problems, consider only a
narrow class of options, are too concerned with protecting their program's turf against other departments or agencies, or are too constrained by their own professional training as engineers or lawyers to
see the big picture. 229 The EPA's leadership needs to overcome these
tendencies toward fragmentation if the agency is to achieve a true
multimedia focus. 230
Reflecting the agency's own implicit acknowledgement of the inability of its single-medium focussed program offices to innovate, EPA
in 1995 placed responsibility for Project XL in the agency's Office of
Policy, Planning, and Evaluation (the "Policy Office"), rather than in a
medium-specific program office. 231 The Policy Office's staff includes
225. See generally id. at 70-90 (discussing various aspects of EPA's internal rulemaking
structures).
226. See GAO REpORT, supra note 9, at 18-19.
227. See NAPA, supra note 35, at 127.
228. See id. at 126-27; see also GAO REpORT, supra note 9, at 32 ("EPA has had difficulty achieving 'buy-in' among the agency's rank and file, which have grown accustomed to
prescriptive, medium-by-medium regulation during the agency's 27-year history.").
229. There are six defining characteristics of agencies following the techno-bureaucratic model: 1) people working for a techno-bureaucratic agency often have a mission
orientation in which they elevate the agency's statutory or general regulatory goals; 2) program office staff often have an action orientation in favor of issuing rules rather than waiting for more studies because they are evaluated in part based upon the number of rules
issued; 3) staff often have restricted planning horizons, or are focused upon short-range
problems and do not have enough time for long-range planning; 4) techno-bureaucratic
rationality is inclined to narrow options early in the decisionmaking process and tends to
be unreceptive to new options that are developed later, resulting in bounded options; 5) a
regulatory bureaucracy is often intensely turf conscious about which regulatory issues fall
within its domain; and 6) the thinking of many professional staff is constrained by their
professional perspective as lawyers, scientists, economists and especially engineers. See McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 220, at 8-10.
230. See NAPA, supra note 35, at 126-27; see generally GAO REpORT, supra note 9, at
16-17.
231. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,529.
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many regulatory analysts who tend to favor innovative approaches to
make regulations more cost-efficient. 232 In early 1997, EPA Administrator Carol Browner reassigned Project XL and the Common Sense
Initiative to the newly created Office of Reinvention, which is
designed to carry out the agency's new multimedia reforms. 233 In light
of the serious budget constraints that federal agencies are likely to
face for the foreseeable future, the Clinton Administration is likely to
be successful in transforming EPA from a single-medium to a truly
multimedia organization only if the agency has the authority to reassign significant personnel and functions from the. single-medium program offices to the Office of Reinvention and other multimedia
offices.
D.

Possible Strategies for Regulatory Flexibility

While in recent years EPA has made some efforts to coordinate
its medium-specific programs into a more multimedia approach, both
existing statutes and the fragmented congressional committee structure impede the agency's efforts at integration. Further, the threat of
prolonged litigation about the legality of regulatory reform initiatives
is another obstacle to reform. To solve these problems, it is essential
for Congress to enact multimedia reform legislation enabling EPA to
take a decisive step toward being a unified agency with the authority
to adopt a comprehensive multimedia approach. Part I.D.1 describes
the general advantages of such delegation. Part I.D.2 describes the
specific forms this d.elegation ought to take.
1.

The Case for Delegation of Greater Authority to EPA

Congress needs to delegate greater authority to EPA to undertake regulatory reform initiatives and issue multimedia permits because the current statutory scheme, oriented toward individual media,
is too inflexible. Increasing regulatory flexibility and providing the
agency with clear authority for multimedia regulation would encourage the agency to reorganize itself and overcome its current single-medium orientation. Finally, increasing the agency's authority is
the only way for the agency to overcome obstacles to regulatory reform and multimedia regulation created by Congress' fragmented
committee structure.
The proposed statute and the increased authority it would give to
the agency would also encourage EPA to undertake more comprehen232. See THOMAS o. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY 239-40, 256-60 (1991);
Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,529.
.
233. See Lori Tripoli, Reinventing EPA, 12 No. 10 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG.
STRATEGY 6 (1997); GAO REpORT, supra note 9, at 27-28 (discussing EPA's plans for new
Office of Reinvention).
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 41 1998-1999

42

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 25:1

sive planning. Because Congress has provided limited or nonexistent
statutory authority for conducting comprehensive planning, EPA has
tended to take a relatively narrow view of planning and the overall
role of the regulatory processes. 234 Congress needs to give EPA
greater flexibility to tackle emerging environmental issues, especially
the problem of multimedia pollution.
As a functional rather than a constitutional matter, Congress
wisely leaves much decision making to agencies because legislative
bodies are too busy with political issues, too unwieldy in size and often
too fragmented to provide effective direction to administrative agencies. 235 The existing approach to administrative delegations, however,
could be more efficient if Congress provided agencies with greater
regulatory flexibility in choosing whether, for example, to impose
technology-based controls or to use economic incentives. 236
In addition, EPA can usually promulgate new regulations through
notice-and-comment rule making much faster than the typical six-toeight year lead time it takes for Congress to amend major environmentallegislation. 237 For instance, in 1986 Congress amended CERCLA legislation with the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA"),238 but has been unable in the last ten
years to enact major changes despite the introduction of several bills
in Congress and enormous public debate. 239 The ability to rapidly
234. See Andrews, supra note 158, at 522-23.
235. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. EeoN. & ORGAN. 81, 95-99 (1985). Although Congressional creation of a
general committee for overseeing the regulatory process, development of a regulatory
budget that limits the cost of regulation, or establishment of a permanent staff assigned the
task of evaluating regulatory programs could overcome problems associated with eliminating administrative delegation, those possibilities are unlikely to materialize because of congressional fragmentation; individual committees or members are unlikely to want to cede
such authority to a centralized body. See Lazarus, Congressional Oversight, supra note
185, at 232-37 (proposing reforms to reduce congressional fragmentation and excessive
oversight but acknowledging the difficulty of achieving such reforms); Lazarus, Tragedy of
Distrust, supra note 197, at 367-68 (arguing that Congress is unlikely to reduce the amount
of oversight over EPA or fix the legislature's fragmented committee structure).
236. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 32843 (1987) (arguing that delegation is appropriate, but that the political branches could
greatly improve efficiency by directing agencies to use economic incentives rather than
centralized prescriptive regulation).
237. See Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 514.
238. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 10,
26,29,33, and 42 U.S.c.).
239. See, e.g., Allan Freedman, EPA's Call for Superfund Bill Has Not Dispelled
Doubts, 55 CONGo Q. 173 (1997) (observing that chances for Superfund legislation during
1997 were questionable); James E. Satterfield, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
Revolution: The Environmental Record of the l04th Congress, 27 ENVTL. L. REp. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,019, 10,028-30 (Jan. 1997) (discussing failed efforts to amend CERCLA during
104th Congress). In 1996, Congress did enact new amendments to CERCLA, "The Asset
Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996," by attachHeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 42 1998-1999
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change regulatory methods is essential to keep up with the constantly
evolving scientific knowledge of environmental risks and solutions.
2.

Forms of Delegation

A number of options are available to effect the needed reform.
Among these are: enacting a single statute incorporating or taking the
place of all other environmental statutes; enacting a general waiver
statute permitting EPA to waive statutory requirements when waiver
is in the public interest; enacting a statute permitting EPA to use comparative risk assessment to set priorities and allocate resources; and
creating outcome-based legislation that would permit EPA to measure
its performance by the outcome of its programs. The following section suggests that enacting outcome-based legislation is the most feasible and effective option.
a.

Single Statute Reform

Some commentators and environmental groups have recommended transforming EPA into a cabinet level Department of the Environment and adopting a single, comprehensive environmental
protection statute within which priorities could be set with greater discretion or upon a broader basis.240 Some also argue that other agencies with environmental responsibilities such as the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Agency should be merged into a new cabinet level
EPA.241
As a practical matter, however, these proposals would be difficult
to implement. For one, these proposals have stalled in Congress both
because some environmentalists believe that comparative risk assessment tends to understate broader public concerns about the risks of
many substances,242 and because industry has often been more concerned with reducing the total burden of regulation than with making
existing regulation more efficient. 243 In addition, Congress may adopt
iug them to the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act. See Pub. L. No. 104-208
(Sept. 30, 1996); Buzbee, supra note 175, at 10,656-63. While these amendments are significant for banks, lenders, and fiduciaries, they do not represent a major change in
CERCLA's overall liability scheme or cleanup procedures.
240. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON THE ENV'T, CHOOSING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 47-51
(1993) (endorsing proposal for Department of Environment with organic statute); John S.
Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 280, 349-52 [hereinafter Applegate] (discussing
Conservation Foundation proposal for cabinet-level Department of Environment and single, comprehensive environmental protection statute, and arguing proposal would provide
suitable framework within which to set priorities).
241. See Lazarus, Tragedy of Distrust, supra note 197, at 369-70.
242. See infra Part II.B.
243. Before 1995, Congress considered bills that would have created a Cabinet-level
Department of the Environment, but House Democratic leaders in 1994 withdrew such a
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symbolic legislation that elevates EPA to cabinet level status but does
not give the agency greater authority to reallocate resources or
enough resources to carry out comparative risk assessment. 244
As a matter of pragmatic politics, it may be better to delay the
consideration of a comprehensive environmental protection statute
until Congress first creates a workable program for integrated permits
and flexibility for alternative compliance methods. Some critics favor
the creation of one-stop permitting that would allow a facility to obtain a single permit for all its land, water, and air pollution activities,
but such critics vehemently oppose efforts to create an enlarged EPA
that would address all environmental problems by implementing a
unified statute that incorporates a single, uniform standard of "unreasonable risk" to health and the environment. 245 These critics may be
won over to an integrated pollution control strategy that focuses on
integrating risks or controls at a single facility or geographic area and
that provides for ample opportunities for public involvement. Part
D.2 makes proposals to achieve integrated pollution control at individual sites. If that program goes well, perhaps Congress would seriously consider enacting a broader comparative risk assessment
scheme.
A final question is whether it is appropriate to use a single statute
to reform the whole environmental law field. A primary goal of environmental law reform ought to be to replace the single-medium approach of several statutes with a single integrated approach to
pollution contro1. 246 Furthermore, enacting a single statute authorizing regulatory experiments and alternative compliance agreements
may be the best way to encourage or force Congress to reevaluate the
several major environmental statutes. In light of the several years it
usually takes Congress to amend a single environmental statute,247 it
is tempting to try to use one statute to reform the entire area rather
than to try to amend several different statutes. It is probably easier
bill when it became clear that it could not be passed without support from conservatives
who demanded to add amendments requiring the proposed Department to conduct risk
assessments and cost-benefit analysis before issuing regulations. See, e.g., H.R. 3425, 103rd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Applegate, supra note 240, at 280, 351-52 & n.424 (citing proposed
legislation to create cabinet-level Department of Environment); General Policy: Future of
EPA Cabinet Bill Uncertain Following House Vote on Amendment Rule, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1719 (Feb. 04,1994); EPA Cabinet Status, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1660, 1660-61 (Jan.
24,1994).
244. See Andrews, supra note 158, at 579-80.
245. See Krier & Brownstein, supra note 22, at 127.
246. See FIORINO, supra note 185, at 68-69; Andrews, supra note 158, at 545; Finkel &
Golding, supra note 198, at 197; Lazarus, Congressional Oversight, supra note 185, at 230;
Shapiro, supra note 206, at 25-26.
247. See FIORINO, supra note 185, at 68-69; Andrews, supra note 158, at 545; Finkel &
Golding, supra note 198, at 197; Lazarus, Congressional Oversight, supra note 185, at 230.
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and faster to give EPA the authority to deviate from existing statutes
if a firm submits a compelling alternative compliance plan than to reexamine each individual statute.
Nevertheless, there are valid objections to adopting a single statute as a means to achieve regulatory reform. Any reform effort is
likely to cause some confusion by upsetting predictable patterns of
regulation and a single statute affecting several different existing statutes is especially likely to create unintended consequences. 248 During
the 104th Congress, legislators introduced several single-statute regulatory reform bills that mandated cost-benefit and risk analysis, that
might have impacted existing environmental laws, and that could have
substantially interfered with EPA's ability to promulgate new regulations or enforce existing ones. 249 While it should be easier for the
public to understand a single reform statute than several different
ones, a more site-specific, individualized approach to regulation may
increase the cost of acquiring information and thereby favor industry
at the expense of the general public. 250 After President Clinton successfully blocked comprehensive conservative deregulation efforts, he
and Republican leaders were able to compromise on more modest bipartisan reforms of individual statutes, including the Safe Drinking
Water Act Amendments of 1996.251 Accordingly, sometimes it is better to take one successful small step at reform than to fail to achieve
one large leap.
In addition, a single-statute reform act is likely to be more general and hence more vague than a series of more specific statutes. In
other words, a single statute may be less effective than several more
specific ones simply because it tries to cover too many diverse areas of
environmental protection. Both NEPA and TSCA are broader than
most single-medium statutes, but neither has been terribly effectiveperhaps because courts, recognizing that the statutes are so broad as
to impose potentially immense and burdensome requirements on

248. See William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The "Legislative
Mirage" of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298, 300-02 (1996).
249. See Buzbee, supra note 248, at 381 & passim.
250. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 15 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. vii, xvi (1996); see also Buzbee, supra note 248, at 370-71 (arguing single-statute reform bills can reduce ability of public to scrutinize agency process and outcome if
statute is less transparent than existing statutes); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1213-15 (1977) (arguing that national environmental groups
are usually more effective than local groups because the former have lower transaction
costs in representing environmental interests and in raising money); see also Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 306, 319-21 (discussing the different implications of national
rulemaking and individualized variances for public involvement).
251. Pub. L. 104-182.
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agencies,252 have tended to read them narrowly. Indeed, the proposed
single-statute regulatory reform bills in the 104th Congress were so
potentially broad in scope that courts would have faced a difficult task
in deciding how to construe them.253

b.

A General Waiver Statute

By enacting a general waiver statute authorizing EPA to waive
any requirement whenever the agency believes it is in the public interest to do so, Congress could empower the agency to modify existing
rules without amending the underlying substantive statute that authorizes the specific regulation at issue. 254 Congress could adopt a similar
waiver statute that would delegate to EPA the discretion to waive statutory requirements for regulatory flexibility projects that achieved
greater or at least equal compliance with existing laws.255
For instance, section 101(c) of the Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977256 authorizes the Secretary of Labor to modify any mine safety
standard if she "determines that an alternative method of achieving
the result of such standard exists which will ... guarantee no less than
the same measure of protection afforded ... by such standard, or that
the application of such standard ... will not result in a diminution of
safety to the miners in such mine."257 Mine safety is undoubtedly an
important and complex issue. However, the myriad questions raised
by the several major environmental statutes-and especially the problem of taking an integrated, multimedia approach that transcends the
often narrow, single-medium focus of most existing environmental
statutes-raise far more difficult concerns about measuring whether
an alternative compliance method provides equivalent protection to
the public as well as miners. Furthermore, a general waiver provision
that applies to all environmental statutes would clearly affect a far
broader range of the national economy than a waiver that only impacts mine safety. Accordingly, it would likely be much more difficult
to convince Congress to delegate such a broad range of waiver discretion to EPA. Furthermore, a general waiver statute would not provide
sufficient congressional guidance to EPA. A general waiver would not
specify which types of alternative compliance methods would be ac252. See Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d 1230-31 (placing burden on EPA to justify
TSCA regulation banning use of asbestos); Buzbee, supra note 248, at 318-19, 373-75 (arguing that courts have narrowly construed NEPA in part because its language is so broad
and vague).
253. See Buzbee, supra note 248, at 344-48, 367-69, 38l.
254. See Fiorino, supra note 21, at 481 n.159.
255. See ld.
256. See generally 30 U.S.c. §§ 801-962 (1994).
257. 30 U.S.c. § 811(c} (1994).
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ceptable or the minimum level of public safety and participation that
would be permittable.

c.

Comparative Risk Assessment

A third approach would be for Congress to adopt a comprehensive statute that allows EPA to use some type of comparative risk assessment analysis to set priorities and to reallocate agency resources.
This would allow the agency to undertake both risk-based priority setting and integrated pollution control measures across environmental
media. 258 Since 1987, EPA has undertaken a number of studies that
examine the possibilities of using relative risk as a primary criterion
for setting priorities among its diverse responsibilities and has found
that existing congressional and agency priorities correlate much more
strongly with perceived risk than with calculated risk.259 For example,
the environmental and health risks posed by hazardous waste sites
tend to be considerably smaller than for pesticide residues, but Congress and various Presidents have provided far greater funding for the
former problem. 26o The EPA hopes to use these studies to determine
which problems deserve the earliest attention and the greatest alloca258. See Applegate, supra note 240, at 279; Paul S. Wilson & Ted K. Harris, Integrated
Pollution Control: A Prologue, 22 ENVTL. L. i, iii, viii-x (1992). In 1988, EPA's Science
Advisory Board appointed a Research Strategies Committee, chaired by former Deputy
Administrator Alvin Aim. Andrews, supra note 158, at 554. The Committee issued a report, FUTURE RISK: RISK REDUCITON STRATEGIES FOR THE 1990s, recommending that
EPA shift its research priorities from meeting preconceived regulatory imperatives to
preventing or reducing environmental risks and anticipating new problems. See SCIENCE
ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECITON AGENCY, FUTURE RISK: RESEARCH STRATEGIES FOR THE 1990s 4, 12 (1988).
259. See EPA, SCI. ADVISORY BD., RELATIVE RISK REDUCITON STRATEGIES COMM.
REDUCING RISK: SE1TING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 2, 16 (1990) [hereinafter SAB, REDUCING RISK]; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECITON
AGENCY, COMPARING RISKS AND SETTING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES: OVERVIEW OF
THREE REGIONAL PROJECTS (1989) [hereinafter EPA, COMPARING RISKS]; EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987)
[hereinafter EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS]' These developments are described and critically reviewed in Andrews, supra note 158, at 553; Applegate, supra note 240, at 279 &
passim; Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 563-69 (1992) [hereinafter Hornstein,
Normative Critique]; Symposium, Risk Analysis and the United States Environmental Protection Agency, 21 ENVTL. L. 1321 (1991); Symposium, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 251 (1995); Setting Environmental Priorities: The Debate
About Risk, EPA J., March/April 1991.
260. See Applegate, supra note 240, at 279; but see Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science,
U. CHI. L. REV. 449, 466-67 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECITVE RISK REGULATION (1993)) (questioning reliability of comparative risk assessment studies); Hornstein, Normative Critique, supra note 259 (because
Superfund sites present concentrated risks that could wipe out an entire family, society can
legitimately expend more money on such cleanups than upon higher, but more diffuse
risks).
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tion of EPA's limited resources and, to the extent that statutes permit,
to reorder its priorities accordingly.261
During the Bush administration, EPA Administrator William
Reilly made comparative risk assessment and its implementation a
personal priority.262 During the Clinton Administration, a National
Performance Review Office headed by Vice President Gore issued a
report that endorsed risk prioritization, and called for greater emphasis on identifying future risks and avoiding them. 263 Furthermore,
EPA sought to shift its resources to high-risk problems264 and asked
its independent Science Advisory Board to revise and update the Reducing Risk 265 study on priority setting issued during the Bush Administration. 266 However, as Part II.B.l will discuss,
environmentalists' potential challenges to science's ability to compare
different types of risks may make experimentation with multimedia
permits and alternative compliance strategies at individual sites good
policy. If those experiments are successful, EPA can then tackle comprehensive comparative risk regulation.

d.

Outcome-Based Legislation

To the extent that it is possible for an agency, especially EPA, to
measure its performance or the outcome of its programs, Congress
should strongly consider giving it considerable autonomy in selecting
which regulatory methods to use, as long as the agency achieves the
results specified in a statute. 267 In some ways, it is easier for Congress
to set performance standards for EPA because the agency regulates
pollution that can be measured in quantitative amounts. On the other
hand, environmental quality or risk issues often cannot be captured in
purely quantitative terms and, accordingly, it is difficult to measure
the agency's performance in achieving more subjective goals. There
are a number of possible performance measures that Congress could
261. Applegate, supra note 240, at 279.
262. See, e.g., William K. Reilly, Taking Aim Toward 2000: Rethinking the Nation's Environmental Agenda, 21 ENVTL. L. 1359 (1991); William K. Reilly, The Turning Point: An
Environmental Vision for the 1990s, 20 ENV'T REp. (BNA) 1386 (Dec. 8, 1989); Applegate,
supra note 240, at 279.
263. See OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS: Ac·
COMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 53-57 (1993) (recommendation REG07); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National Performance
Review's Regulatory Recommendations, 43 DUKE L.J. 1165, 1174-76 (1994) (discussing National Performance Review's recommendations for ranking risks and engaging in anticipatory planning).
264. See EPA, A PROGRESS REPORT ON REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA·
TION, supra note 5, at 10-11.
265. See SAB, REDUCING RISK, supra note 259, at 5.
266. See EPA, A PROGRESS REPORT ON REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA·
TION, supra note 5, at 10-11.
267. See Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 525-30.
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use, including cost-effectiveness, risk reduction, the total amount of
pollution released, or the percentage of waste recycled. 268 The PIT
Concept Paper appropriately recognized that EPA should first attempt to set performance standards based upon ambient environmental goals, then, as a second-best approach, to establish performance
standards using technological achievability as the primary criterion
and, finally, to use technology or management-specific standards as
only a last resort. 269
Although the use of outcome-based performance measures may
impose additional reporting burdens on the agency, EPA currently has
to issue at least thirty-seven annual reports to Congress each year.
New legislation discussed below already requires the agency to develop performance measures, so the additional reporting burden may
be relatively small.270 There are strong reasons for Congress to authorize EPA to create pilot programs to test the concept of performance-based standards, or at least to issue a limited number of
experimental integrated permits.
The Clinton Administration's regulatory reform initiatives emphasize the use of performance-based standards as a means to increase the cost-effectiveness of regulation and to promote innovative
alternative compliance strategies. 271 In particular, the Clinton plan
proposes that EPA conduct demonstrations of one-stop multimedia
permits using performance-based criteria,2n and give states and tribes
the flexibility to use performance-based programs as part of the
NEPPS program. 273 To understand how performance-based standards
might work and what they are, it will be useful to examine two recently enacted statutes: the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 [Performance Act],274 and the Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996 [1996 Amendments ].275
The Performance Act requires agencies to begin developing performance measures by September 30, 1997276 and then to issue a report on their performance by the year 2000. 277 Because the
Performance Act authorizes pilot performance measurement projects
for the 1994-96 fiscal years,278 EPA in its 1994 Five-Year Strategic Plan
268. See Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 529.
269. See supra Part I.B.2.e.iii.
270. See NAPA, supra note 35, at 126.
271. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 2, at 5-7, 13-14.
272. See id. at 26, 40, Appendix A, Nos. 10, 24.
273. See id. at 22, Appendix A, No.6.
274. Pub. L. No. 103-62, § 2, 107 Stat. 285, 285.
275. Pub. L. 104-182.
276. See 5 V.s.c. § 306 (1994).
277. See 31 V.S.c. § 1116.
278. See 31 V.S.c. § 1118.
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committed itself to "[m]easure performance to assess whether EPA
programs and activities are achieving their intended results, and to
comply with" the 1993 Performance Act. 279
Once agencies establish performance-based measurements, Congress would need to reevaluate many existing environmental and
other statutes that rigidly define the choice of agency regulatory
method. But so far Congress has made only a limited effort to amend
existing environmental statutes and expand EPA's ability to use performance-based measures or controls.280 Recently, however, Congress has been willing to enact some environmental legislation that
provides EPA with greater regulatory flexibility and focuses more on
results than on prescribing regulatory methods. For instance, in August 1996, the Republican led Congress compromised with Democrats
to enact the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act and repealed a requirement in the Act's 1986 Amendments requiring EPA to set standards
for twenty-five different drinking water contaminants every three
years, which the agency had failed to achieve in any case. 281 By contrast, the 1996 amendments provide significant regulatory flexibility
by allowing EPA to target those contaminants that pose the greatest
risk, based on risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. 282 Furthermore, if EPA concludes that the benefits of any standard promulgated
under the new law would not justify the costs to water systems, the
agency may issue a less stringent standard, provided that the regulation maximizes health risk reduction at a cost that is justified.283 Thus,
the 1996 Amendments give EPA much more flexibility to select the
279. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE NEW GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: EPA's FIVE-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN 38 (1994) (EPA 200-B-94-002); Wilkins
& Hunt, supra note 160, at 517.
280. See Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 517-18.
281. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act's 1996 Amendments, EPA was supposed to
regulate 83 contaminants by 1989, and then regulate another 25 every three years. Regulatory Changes Under SDWA Consistent With EPA "Program Redirection," Official Says, 27
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1039, 1039 (Sept. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Regulatory Changes Under
SDWA]. By the time of the August 1996 amendments to the Act, EPA had published
standards for most of the original 83, but none of the first round of 25. See id.
282. See, e.g., Allan Freedman, Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments, 54 CONGo Q.
2622 (1996); New Law Focuses on Worst Contaminants, Provides Financial Assistance to
Communities, 27 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 820, 820 (Aug. 9, 1996) [hereinafter New Law]. In
choosing which contaminants to place on the master list, EPA must select the substances
that pose the greatest public health concern, and must be especially concerned with
whether these substances pose special health risks to the most vulnerable groups, such as
infants, children, pregnant women, the elderly and seriously ill. See Freedman, Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments, 54 Congo Q. at 2622, 2627. Within five years of enactment and
every five years thereafter, EPA must consider whether to regulate at least five chemicals
from the master list or even those not on the list, but the agency has the discretion not to
regulate any of those contaminants as long as it provides public comment on the issue and
is able to justify a decision not to regulate on appeal. The EPA's determination whether to
regulate or not regulate is final agency action subject to legal challenge. See id. at 2622.
283. See Freedman, supra note 282, at 2623; New Law, supra note 281, at 820.
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chemicals to regulate and to make tradeoffs between the risks of disinfection bypro ducts and microbes. It remains to be seen, however,
whether Congress will amend other major environmental statutes to
give EPA greater regulatory flexibility.
II

ACHIEVING RESPONSIBLE REFORM

Part I of this Article has demonstrated the necessity and desirability of reform and illustrated a number of ways this reform may
come to be. But in pursuing this reform agenda, there must be certain
safeguards. Part II addresses a number of problems that would arise
in implementing reform and proposes solutions. First among these
problems is the political issue of delegating significant authority and
autonomy to EPA. As Part ILA illustrates, the potential for abuse of
such authority is not as great as imagined, and the benefits of giving
EPA greater authority to allow alternative compliance strategies far
outweigh any disadvantages. Part ILB discusses a number of legitimate concerns regarding the establishment of multimedia regulation.
Chief among these concerns are problems with risk assessment, especially of multimedia trading or emissions averaging and public participation, particularly by disadvantaged groups or those at high risk.
This section demonstrates how these problems present themselves in
Project XL and how EPA has attempted to deal with them. Part ILC
demonstrates why EPA's attempts to correct these problems have
been inadequate and suggests a number of statutory provisions Congress should enact to ensure that regulatory reform is undertaken in
the most responsible manner possible.
A.

Concerns About Giving EPA Greater Authority; Solutions to
These Problems

1.

The Case Against Delegation

a.

Nondelegation Issues

Strong political theory arguments exist for significantly restricting
the delegation of authority to administrative agencies. Opponents of
delegation often argue that vague delegations delegitimize representative governance or suggest that statutory vagueness leads to an overall
reduction in public welfare. 284 According to democratic theory, Congress, instead of bureaucrats, ought to make significant policy deci284. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980); Peter
H. Aranson et aI., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 297-312, 314-18, 321-22 (1987); but see infra Part II.A.2.
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sions and explicitly state those choices in the statutory text. 285 In
addition, congressional policymaking ought to strengthen public participation because public officials are supposed to be more accessible
to the public than technical experts in a bureaucracy.286 Moreover,
legislative priority setting should eliminate lengthy administrative delays.287 All of these political theory arguments, however, must face
the reality that Congress' large size, its highly partisan deliberations,
its fragmented committee structure, and the sheer amount of detail
and complexity in the modern world make it nearly impossible for
Congress to address issues without delegating substantial responsibilities to administrative agencies. 288
Despite an effort during the 1970s and 1980s by Justice Rehnquist
and some commentators to revive the nondelegation doctrine,289 the
Supreme Court is unlikely to revitalize that doctrine because a strict
application of that principle would invalidate numerous statutes. 290
Some scholars have proposed to reformulate the delegation doctrine
to make judicial review of delegations more acceptable,291 but even a
modified application of the delegation doctrine would invalidate many
popular regulatory programs and, accordingly, would be unacceptable
to most members of Congress and the Supreme Court.292

285. Andrews, supra note 158, at 520; Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic
Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1703 (1995).
286. See Wagner, supra note 285, at 1703.
287. See id. at 1703-04.
288. See supra Part I.C.2.
289. See American Textiles Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explicitly relying upon the non delegation doctrine as a basis for
rejecting the statutory delegation at issue); Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-75 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (same); 1 Wilkins
& Hunt, supra note 160, at 541 (discussing revival of nondelegation doctrine during 1970s
and 1980s, but arguing that such efforts have proven unsuccessful).
290. Since 1937, courts have usually refused to invoke the delegation doctrine to invalidate broad congressional delegations of power to agencies, concluding such questions
ought to be resolved through political mechanisms of representative government. See
Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, supra note 236, at 326.
291. See Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 345, 351-53
(1987) (reformulating nondelegation doctrine in terms of public/private goods distinction);
David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 355,365-66 (1987); David Schoenbrod,
The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 124960 (1985) (developing test for judicial review of delegated authority).
292. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 391,400-01 (1987) ("Professor Schoenbrod's
proposal would invalidate ninety-nine percent of all present delegations to agencies .... ");
Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, supra note 236, at 327 ("As [Pierce] shows, the
Schoenbrod test would invalidate most of the federal regulatory statutes now on the
books.").
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Agency Bias

The regulatory flexibility presented by Project XL and this Article could provide opportunities to an agency to make only token efforts to comply with the statute's performance measures. Under
section 110 of the Clean Air Act, states are given considerable regulatory flexibility to create an individualized state implementation plan
(SIP) to meet or exceed national ambient air quality standards set by
EPA.293 Some commentators have charged that certain states deliberately took advantage of section 110's flexibility to produce "cheater
SIPs," and that EPA, often for political reasons, approved SIPs that
the agency knew would fail to achieve statutorily mandated attainment requirements. 294 Similarly, it is possible that EPA could deliberately manipulate any statute that grants it greater flexibility, but even
under current statutory requirements some agency leaders may either
shirk or over-zealously enforce agency mandates.
Although fears that industry will "capture" an agency are often
exaggerated,295 especially in the case of an agency that regulates numerous industries,296 a greater possibility exists that an agency might
either shirk or over-zealously enforce its responsibilities for ideologicalor political reasons. 297 For instance, during the Reagan Administration, many environmentalists believed that Anne Gorsuch Burford,
Administrator of EPA, and James Watt, Secretary of Interior, used
their discretionary authority in an effort to circumvent statutory mandates that imposed high costs on industry.298 On the other hand, during the Carter Administration, the television industry believed that
Michael Pertscuk, Chair of the Federal Trade Commission, exceeded
the Commission's authority in a moral crusade to improve children's
television advertising.299

2.

Making Delegation Work

Ultimately, any system in which Congress delegates significant
authority to an agency requires vigilance on the part of Congress.
Since President Nixon created EPA in 1970, Congress has vigorously
293. See 42 U.S.c. § 7410; Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 529.
294. See Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New
Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1689-90 (1991).
295. See Mank, Textualist Interpretation, supra note 133, at 1278-1284.
296. See id.
297. See Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 546-47 (discussing problem of agency
shirking or overzealousness).
298. See MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA at 40-59 (1995) (discussing EPA enforcement and congressional oversight during Gorsuch era); Lazarus, Congressional Oversight,
supra note 185, at 216-17, 226 (discussing congressional oversight during Gorsuch era);
Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 532, 547 (discussing Burford and Watt's performance).
299. See Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 160, at 547.
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used oversight hearings to monitor and control the agency.300 In addition, if an agency fails to meet certain performance targets, Congress
could mandate that the agency must implement specific regulatory approaches and establish judicial review procedures to ensure their implementation. 301 On the other hand, Congress should also consider
providing explicit severability clauses in case, for instance, an agency
cannot meet a statutory deadline, as long as the agency is working to
achieve that goal as expeditiously as possible. 302 Even if politically
motivated agency officials could misuse a statute, such as Project XL,
that authorizes regulatory flexibility, agencies already fail to comply
with current statutes that require certain rigid types of regulatory
methods. 303 Accordingly, agencies are not necessarily more likely to
manipulate a statute that allows regulatory flexibility than current
statutes that mandate regulatory requirements. Nevertheless, a regulatory flexibility statute that gives EPA greater discretion to waive
statutory requirements and to substitute alternative compliance methods will require both congressional oversight and public involvement
to prevent any abuses in favor of politically influential firms.
Furthermore, although it is usually assumed that the electoral
process imbues Congress with greater democratic legitimacy than administrative agencies, some commentators argue that delegation of
political authority to administrative agencies can actually improve the
responsiveness of government to the desires of the electorate; agencies can allow interested parties broader participation than can Congress. For instance, senior administrators, including the head of EPA,
may be more accountable to the public on specific issues than most
individual members of Congress, despite the fact that senior administrators can potentially serve longer terms than the two-year term of
representatives to the House. Senior administrators may be more accountable because they are continuously subject to removal by the
President. 304

300. See generally Congressional Oversight, supra note 184, at 205-39.
301. In the past, Congress has often enacted overly stringent judicial review provisions
and must strike a balance between judicial supervision and the need for considerable
agency discretion. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and
Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1251.
302. See Mank, Textualist Interpretation, supra note 133, at 1288.
303. See supra Part I.B.1.
304. See generally Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267,
1300 & n.65 (1985) (agencies can be more accountable to the public than individual members of Congress or committees); but see Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 308-09
(arguing that society is better off when Congress as whole enacts legislation providing clear
direction for an agency's exercise of discretion).
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Concerns About Implementing a Multimedia Approach (The
Case Against Integration)

General Problems with the Multimedia Approach

Although an examination of pollution from an integrated perspective has advantages, some commentators question whether integrated pollution control will really work and are especially worried
that it will lead to an unfortunate reliance on the controversial methodologies of comparative risk assessment. Many proponents of comparative risk assessment seek to use primarily quantitative methods to
rank all environmental risks and then to reallocate environmental priorities and resources according to this ranking. 305 Critics of comparative risk assessment often argue that a quantitative risk assessment
creates a misleading sense of certainty. Critics also suggest that comparative risk assessment focuses too narrowly on expected loss of life
and ignores other issues such as the voluntariness of risk, or the relative concentration or dispersion of damage. 306 Furthermore, these
critics often contend that such centralized, formal systems of expert
decisionmaking have serious flaws because of data limitations, their
own use of heuristics, the threat that regulated industries will capture
an agency, and the failure to address our inability to compare different
types of health risks, such as cancer and neurological damage, or to
make value free decisions about choosing pesticides that pose, for instance, greater or lesser harms to consumers or migrant workers.307 In
addition, critics argue that comparative risk assessment and integrated
pollution control rely on the false premises of "comprehensive rationality" or "synopticism," and seek to accomplish the impossible task of
addressing all the problems and variables in our complex
environment. 308
Furthermore, integrated pollution control schemes raise serious
questions about insuring adequate public participation. Proponents of
a public approach to environmental decisionmaking frequently maintain that it is appropriate for members of the general public to consider qualitative factors in environmental decisionmaking. 309 For
instance, because the risks from Superfund facilities are more geographically concentrated than the risks from radon, which is widely
305. See Krier & Brownstein, supra note 22, at 120, 137-38.
306. See generally Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1073-85 (1990); Hornstein, Normative Critique, supra note 259, at
610-11; Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 280-84 (reviewing critiques of risk
assessment).
307. See Hornstein, Normative Critique, supra note 259, at 610-17.
308. See Krier & Brownstein, supra note 22, at 122-26.
309. See generally Gillette & Krier, supra note 306, at 1073-85; Hornstein, Normative
Critique, supra note 259, at 610-11; Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 280-84 (discussing "public" approach to risk assessment).
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scattered throughout the United States, it may be appropriate for
Congress to place a higher priority on Superfund sites even if a costbenefit or risk analysis would suggest that EPA should allocate more
resources to indoor air pollution. 310 Furthermore, critics of comparative risk assessment often argue that proponents are too dismissive of
the ability of the general public to make risk judgments without assistance from experts. Those critics point to some evidence that the public is in fact able to distinguish among small, medium, and large risks
when responding to surveys that specifically ask respondents to specify how many people are likely to die from a particular cause such as
smoking. 311
Critics of comparative risk assessment sometimes argue that the
same problems of measuring the riskiness of various chemicals apply
to integrated pollution strategies, which may use comparative risk assessment methodologies at an individual facility level. A controversial
issue arises with both cross-media or cross-pollutant averaging or trading because there is a lack of scientific information about the longterm health implications of either type of exchange. 312 Both comparative risk assessment and integrated pollution control may be inappropriate because society does not have enough information about the
chemicals involved and the long-term implications of shifting priorities among different agency programs or different media. In particular, very little scientific information exists about the long-term
implications of cross-media and cross-pollutant trading. 313 Hence,
even if integration is a good policy in the abstract, the crucial question
is how far integration should go when substantial uncertainties remain
about the risks of many disparate chemicals, or the mechanisms by
which chemicals travel through different media to reach the human
body.314
Substantial uncertainties exist about the risks of most carcinogens. Therefore, many environmentalists would prefer that Congress
or EPA ban the trading of different carcinogens and the trading of
carcinogens with noncarcinogens, because it is philosophically and scientifically impossible to compare the tradeoffs among different kinds
310. See Hornstein Normative Critique, supra note 259, at 441.
311. See Facing Our Fears, 61 CONSUMER REPORTS, Dec. 1996, at 50-53 (arguing that
surveys asking specifically about the numbers of victims show that the public "can distinguish big risks from moderate and little ones.").
312. See infra Part II.C.2.a.
313. See id.
314. See generally Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 281-89 (discussing
problems associated with measuring the risks of different carcinogens and noncarcinogens), 336-37 (discussing limitations in EPA exposure assessments and suggesting potentially troubling implications for minority groups whose consumption patterns may differ
from the agency's assumptions about how most people eat, work or live).
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of diseases. 315 At the end of the Bush Administration, in 1992, EPA
proposed to allow averaging-i.e., trading-off different carcinogens
and even non carcinogens with carcinogens according to a complex
weighting system that purported to measure the relative toxicity of
various widely used carcinogens. 316 Because of opposition to the
Bush proposal by environmentalists, including environmental justice
groups, in 1993 and 1994, the Clinton Administration largely abandoned the proposal for averaging of different carcinogens, and also
noncarcinogens, by giving states the discretion not to allow such averaging (which most states opposed) and by increasing the scientific burden of proof on industry to justify such averaging. In 1993 and 1994
the Clinton Administration responded to environmentalists' (including environmental justice groups317) opposition to the Bush proposal
by abandoning the Bush proposal for the averaging of different carcinogens and noncarcinogens. The administration gave states the discretion not to allow such averaging (which most states opposed318 ) and
increased the scientific burden of proof on industry to justify such
averaging. 319 The Clinton EPA, however, has not definitely prohib315. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,530-32 (discussing concerns about cross-media
and cross-pollution trading); see generally Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 28188 (questioning EPA proposal during Bush administration to allow emissions averaging of
different carcinogen and even non carcinogens because of serious uncertainties about the
risks of each carcinogen and broader policy concerns about the ability of society to compare the risks of different chemicals).
316. See Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry and Seven Other Processes, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,608, 62,631 (1992) (proposing averaging of different hazardous air pollutants by one industry); Compliance
Extensions for Early Reductions, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,970, 61,980-85 (1992) (proposing risk
index that assigns weighting factors to 47 different chemicals and allows different carcinogens and noncarcinogens to be averaged based on risk index); Mank, Exception Process,
supra note 16, at 284-85, and especially n.98.
317. See Witnesses Oppose Averaging, Trading Provisions in HaN Proposal at Public
Hearing in Louisiana, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3045 (Mar. 26, 1993) (national environmental
groups and local environmental justice groups opposed Bush EPA proposal to allow emissions averaging of different carcinogens at public hearing in Louisiana); Mank, Exception
Process, supra note 16, at 283-88.
318. See NESHAP: Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic
Chemical Manufacturing Industry and Seven Other Processes, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,478 (1993)
(proposing to give states greater discretion to disapprove emissions averaging by industry);
States Expected to Avoid Averaging on Air Toxics, Agency's Air Chief Says, 24 ENv'T REP.
(BNA) 1474, 1474 (Dec. 3, 1993); Plan to Give States Discretion on Averaging of Toxic
Emissions Meets Industry Opposition, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1464, 1464-65 (Dec. 3, 1993);
see also Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 286-88; but see Final HaN Rule Could
Cut Toxic Emissions from Chemical Manufacturing By 90%, 24 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1883,
1883-84 (Mar. 4, 1994) (some environmentalists fear industry will pressure states to allow
averaging of hazardous air pollutants).
319. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories: Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry and Other Processes Subject to the Negotiated Regulation for Equipment
Leaks, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,402, 19,408 (1994) (limiting emissions averaging of hazardous air
pollutants and requiring industry to conduct risk assessment justifying such averaging);
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ited the possibility of carcinogenic trading. 320 Indeed, in its Project
XL agreement with Intel Corporation's Chandler, Arizona facility, the
Clinton Administration effectively approved a limited degree of averaging of different carcinogens by approving the use of a facility-wide
aggregate emissions cap for hazardous air pollutants. 321

2.

Problems as Manifested in Project XL

While the most pressing problem threatening the success of Project XL is the need for explicit legislative authorization to define
EPA's authority to implement the program, there are other problems
with XL that either Congress or an EPA with clear delegated congressional authority needs to address. To ensure responsible reform, Congress and EPA need to integrate both meaningful public participation
and public safety protections into the program. Part II.B.2 examines
the obstacles to this integration and Part II.C presents proposals to
achieve the integration of public participation and public health issues
into Project XL and similar multimedia regulatory reform initiatives.
Legitimate questions about proposals for cross-media and crosspollutant trading, and about the need for more effective public participation, have created both internal and external problems in the implementation of Project XL. The EPA's April 23, 1997 Notice of
Modification represents the agency's attempt to respond to many of
these criticisms. 322
The failure of EPA to establish a "baseline" for what constitutes
superior environmental performance or an acceptable trade among
different classes of pollutants or media troubles some commentators.
These commentators worry that EPA may allow companies to perform their own risk assessments in lieu of the agency conducting its
own, more comprehensive, assessments of the damage emissions
cause to ecosystems, their propensity to bioaccumulate, or their harm
to broader geographic areas. Hence, these commentators are wary of
the "fence-line" assessments for which some industry proposals have
called. 323 In addition, some environmentalists worry that proposed
trades could cause increases in more toxic chemicals or that increased
Hazardous Air Pollutants: Proposed Regulations Governing Constructed, Reconstructed,
or Modified Major Sources, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,504, 15,563 (1994) (implicitly criticizing earlier
proposal from EPA (during Bush administration) to assign weights to many different carcinogens and noncarcinogens); Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 285-88.
320. See Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 286-88.
321. See Mohin, supra note 41, at 10,352 n.60 (According to Intel Manager Timothy J.
Mohin, "Because the cap limited the aggregate of aU HAP (hazardous air pollutant} emissions, critics complained that the mix of chemicals in the total emission stream may change.
This condition could potentially result in higher emissions of more toxic chemicals, without
violating the aggregate emissions cap.").
322. See generally XL Modification, supra note 94.
323. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,531.
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emissions of the same pollutant into one medium may cause different
health impacts that are not redressed by decreases into another medium. This is especially dangerous for racial or cultural minorities
whose eating, working or lifestyle behavior may differ significantly
from the hypothetical "average" person EPA uses when it estimates
how much a person is likely to be exposed to a chemical or facility.324
Further, although it would seem difficult for an environmentalist to
oppose a regulatory reform initiative that straightforwardly reduces a
single pollutant in one medium, such apparent decreases may be deceptive if EPA is likely to impose more stringent controls in the near
future. 325
In addition, critics are concerned about Project XL proposals that
allow participants to trade decreased emissions of one aggregate type
of pollutant, like volatile organic compounds, for increased emissions
of another class of pollutants, like sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide,
or that trade the same pollutant among different media, resulting in,
for example, lower releases into surface water in exchange for higher
releases into the air or land. Their concern arises because there is a
lack of scientific information about the long-term health implications
of both cross-media and cross-pollutant exchanges. 326
Some environmentalists believe that EPA should only allow emissions caps or averaging that involve carcinogens similar to the Intel
agreement if the project proponent conducts a scientific analysis of
these chemicals' potential for synergistic impacts, to bioaccumulate, or
to cause damage to human life or ecosystems. 327 On the other hand,
industry believes that the Project XL process already requires the project proponent to demonstrate that the project will produce an overall
benefit to the environment, will not significantly increase the risk to
324. See id. (discussing concerns about cross-media and cross-pollution trading); see
generally Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 281-88,336-37.
325. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,531; Weyerhaeuser Proposal, supra note, at 1840
(reporting David Hawkins', attorney with Natural Resources Defense Council, criticism
that Project XL agreement between EPA and Weyerhaeuser did not achieve significant
reductions beyond what law would soon require).
326. See William F. Pederson, Jr., Can Site-Specific Pollution Control Plans Furnish an
Alternative to the Current Regulatory Regime and a Bridge to a New One?, 25 ENVTL. L.
REp. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,486, 10,490 (Sept. 1995) (arguing that multimedia pollution trading
is problematic because society does not know how to set the trading ratio between, for
example, releases to air, and releases to water); Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,530-31 (same
and citing Merck & Co., Inc. Project XL for Facilities Final Project Agreement Application, Stonewall Plant, Elkton, Va. (July 28, 1995)); see generally Mank, Exception Process,
supra note 16, at 281-88.
327. See Mohin, supra note 41, at 10,353; Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,531. Intel has
agreed not to exceed Arizona's air quality guidelines, which are based on protection at
one-in-a-million excess lifetime cancer risk, and to use dispersion modeling to predict the
impact of introducing new chemicals. Accordingly, it has indirectly limited the health risks
of emissions trading. See Freeman, supra note 125, at 65 n.195.
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individuals or populations, or significantly shift risk. 328 Furthermore,
industry believes that some environmentalist proposals for greater scientific testing will, as a practical matter, prevent the use of these alternative compliance approaches that produce overall benefits to the
environment. Industry also believes that proposals by environmentalists to require comprehensive risk assessments impose an unnecessary
burden of proof that exceeds that used in any other environmental
area. 329
Furthermore, critics of Project XL and other reform initiatives
often argue that, despite explicit provisions for involving the public,330
these initiatives do not give the public sufficient opportunities to challenge the use of alternative compliance methods. Most members of
the general public and even most environmental advocacy groups are
not equipped to address the complex problems of determining the
synergistic cumulative risk of multimedia pollution and the implications of cross-media or cross-pollutant exchanges. 331 Before April 23,
1997, Project XL did not authorize EPA to provide technical assistance to the general public, local communities, or public interest
groups to enable them to conduct an independent analysis of a project. As Part II.C.2.bjii shows, Project XL does not require the
agency to provide adequate grants. 332 In addition, critics argue that
the current XL process does not require that participants or EPA
make extensive efforts to achieve consensus among various stakeholders before the agency approves a project. 333
In the longer run, if Project XL or similar initiatives develop into
a regulatory framework in which all major industrial sources of pollution negotiate individual discharge agreements with the government,
some environmentalists fear a loss of public control even if community representatives participate in the negotiation. Local groups, on
average, cannot represent the national interest in environmental protection as well as national environmental advocacy groups.334 Environmentalists generally believe that the participation of national
environmental advocacy groups in public notice-and-comment
rulemaking in the Federal Register is a superior means of incorporat328. See Mohin, supra note 41, at 10,352.
329. See id. at 10,353.
330. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,532-34.
331. See generally Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 340-43 (arguing that
Congress should require either EPA or industry to provide technical assistance grants to
citizens who wish to challenge requests by industry for site-specific exceptions to national
regulations); Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,532-34.
332. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,534 (discussing disadvantages environmentalists
face in evaluating environmental proposals); see also Mank, Exception Process, supra note
16, at 340-43.
333. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,534.
334. See Thompson, supra note 250, at xvi.
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ing public involvement than individualized or local proceedings in
which local advocacy groups usually bear higher transaction costs in
terms of organizing, raising money, and educating decisionmakers. 335
Local community groups may not have the time or resources to participate effectively in complex negotiations to develop alternative
compliance strategies. For instance, David Matusow, who was the
sole community representative on the stakeholder panel during the
development of Intel Corporation's new Chandler, Arizona facility,
attended seventy of the one hundred four-to-six-hour meetings the
company scheduled in the space of ten months. Environmentalists
cite this as an example of how site-specific regulatory decisionmaking
can place unreasonable burdens on local activists. 336 Furthermore, if
Project XL or NEPPS allows state and tribal permitting authorities
greater discretion to authorize multimedia permits, some commentators believe that state or tribal agencies are more likely to be captured
by industry or weaken environmental protection provisions in an effort to attract industry from other areas with more stringent environmentallaws. 337 Other commentators, however, have questioned this
"race-to-the-bottom" hypothesis. 338
335. See also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S.
116, 159-65 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that under subsection 301(1) of the
Clean Water Act EPA must create separate subcategories through rulemaking for sources
of toxic pollutants that claim to possess "fundamentally different factors" than sources in
the primary category rather than granting individualized variances that are less subject to
public scrutiny); Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 250, at 1213-15 (arguing that national environmental groups are usually more effective than local groups because the former have
lower transaction costs in representing environmental interests and in raising money);
Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 306 (citing Stewart, supra), 319-21 (discussing
the different implications of national rulemaking and individualized variances for public
involvement).
336. See Regulatory Reform: Participants in Project XL to Meet, Discuss Problems With
Stakeholder Process, 8 DAILY ENV'T REp. (BNA) A-lO (Jan. 13, 1997); but see Mohin,
supra note 41, at 10,348-51 (Intel manager defends Intel's efforts to involve public). Another commentator, however, states that the community advisory panel included not just
David Matusow, but also Barbara Knox, a farmer, and Jim Lemmon, an environmental
consultant. See Freeman, supra note 125, n.183.
337. See Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 306 discussing "race-to-the-bottom" thesis that state environmental regulation may be less stringent than national environmental regulation); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New
(New) Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REv. 97, 177-79
(1996); see generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the "Race-to-the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1210, 1210-11 n.1 (citing sources).
338. Revesz and other critics of the "race-to-the-bouom" thesis maintain that interjurisdictional competition produces efficient regulatory results, and that even if such
competition results in lower environmental standards, that is because such lowering will
enhance social welfare. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570,608-09 (1996) (summarizing "second generation" arguments in favor of
decentralized environmental regulation); Revesz, supra note 337, at 1229-47 (arguing that
competition among states for industry promotes an efficient allocation of industrial activity
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Although it is sometimes easier for a local environmental group
to stir up public interest in a site-specific issue, such as the siting of an
incinerator, than for a national group to develop public concern about
a general rule affecting all new incinerators across the nation, the
problem with local environmental movements is that their strength is
likely to vary considerably from area to area. Accordingly, there will
probably be problems of inconsistency if local environmental groups
are relied upon to provide public participation.
Sometimes, however, local environmental movements are closer
to the interests of the average citizen than national environmental
groups, whose leaders are often far more liberal than the average
voter. 339 For instance, the Quincy Library Group, a coalition of local
environmental organizations and timber companies, was able to reach
an innovative agreement that allowed selective logging in national forests in California's Sierra Nevada as a means to create firebreaks despite opposition from many national environmental groups, which
argued that the agreement allowed too much logging and that the firebreaks were too large. 34o By a 429 to 1 vote in the House of Representatives, Congress ratified and President Clinton signed legislation
approving the agreement. Arguably, this demonstrates that the national environmental groups, which generally favored litigation rather
than compromise over the logging issue, were out-of-touch with most
voters. 341 Furthermore, the environmental justice movement primarily grew as a series of local movements rather than as the result of
planning by national groups, which had often neglected the interests
of the poor and minorities. 342 Thus, a focus on site-specific issues
among states, and that if states may not compete on environmental grounds, they may
compete in other undesirable ways}; see also Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates,
supra note 337, at 178-79 (questioning the quantum and weight of empirical data in support
of the "race-to-the-bottom" thesis that state environmental regulation tends to be less
stringent than national environmental regulation).
339. See Mark E. Rushefsky, Elites and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS AND POLICY 287-96 (James P. Lester ed., 2d ed. 1995) (discussing whether leaders
of national environmental interest groups constitute an "elite" that is overwhelmingly liberal compared to general population and rise of environmental justice movement); see generally Helen Ingram et aI., Interest Groups and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS AND POLICY, supra at 115-45 (discussing membership and views of members of
national environmental interest groups).
340. See Daniel Sneider, Blueprint for a Green Compromise, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 18, 1997, at 1 (reporting success of Quincy Library Group in winning support of Congress and President Clinton for selective logging as method to create firebreaks and unsuccessful opposition of national environmental groups); but see Alexander
Cockburn, Scarring Forests in the Name of Conservation, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 24,
1997, at B7 (criticizing Quincy Library Group bill for creating ecological disaster by allowing unnecessarily wide firebreaks).
341. See Sneider, 339 at 1; but see Cockburn, supra, note 340 at B7.
342. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 634-41, 652-70, 683 (1992)
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might foster the growth of a grassroots environmentalism that is
stronger than the current movement, which is dominated by national
environmental organizations.

3.

EPA's Efforts to Fix Project XL

The EPA has been meeting with representatives of industry, public interest groups, and state regulators to discuss how the agency
could improve Project XL. In late September 1996, a number of state
environmental commissioners met with EPA Administrator Carol
Browner to express concerns about implementation problems with
Project XL.343 In November 1996, EPA sought to respond to these
mounting concerns by issuing a series of draft guidance documents
addressing the development of Project XL projects, including: 1)
stakeholder involvement;344 2) the definition of superior environmental performance; 3) principles for regulatory flexibility;345 and 4) the
XL proposal and project development process. 346 In December 1996,
participants in a Washington D.C. Bar forum discussed various
problems with Project XL and an EPA official from the Policy Office
acknowledged that the program had experienced initial difficulties
and needed to improve. 347 On January 13, 1997, EPA held a public
meeting to address criteria for determining the role of the public and
various stakeholders in Project XL and in defining the concept of superior performance. 348 On April 23, 1997, EPA published a Notice of
Modification to Project XL that clarifies the agency's resolution of
three crucial project issues: 1) the meaning of "superior" environmental performance; 2) the meaning of "regulatory flexibility"; and 3) the
role of the stakeholder in the Project. 349

(contrasting "mainstream" environmentalism, which focuses on legal and scientific specialists, with grassroots environmentalism, which empowers clients); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87
Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 785-89 (1993).
343. See Regulatory Reform: State Environmental Heads to Meet with Browner on Project XL Concerns, 178 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-lO (Sept. 13, 1996).
344. See EPA, Guidelines for Stakeholder Involvement (visited Oct. 3, 1997) <http://
199.223.29.233/xl_home/Stakeholder_Involvement.htmi>.
345. See EPA, Principles for Regulatory Flexibility in Project XL (visited Oct. 3, 1997)
<http://199.223.29.2331xl_homelRegulatory_Flexibility.htmi>.
346. See EPA, XL Proposal and Project Development Process (visited Oct. 3, 1997)
<http://199.223.29.233/xl_home/process_index.htmi>.
347. See EPA's Project XL in Need of Adjustments to Ease Participation, Forum Participants Assert, 27 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1839, 1839 (Jan. 3, 1997).
348. See Industry Representatives, State Regulators Wrestle With Project XL 'Performance' Definition, 27 ENv'T REp. (BNA) 1906, 1906 (Jan. 17, 1997) [hereinafter Project XL
'Performance' Definition].
349. See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,872.
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"Superior" Environmental Performance

The May 23, 1995 Federal Register notice announcing the Project
XL program had stated EPA's intent to approve only applicants
whose projects would "achieve environmental performance that is superior to what would be achieved through compliance with current
and reasonably anticipated future regulation. "350 Even Clinton administration officials, however, conceded that the agency initially
failed to provide adequate guidance about what constitutes "superior"
. environmental performance and some other commentators were far
more critical of the agency's efforts in defining environmental performance. 351 Accordingly, EPA's April 23, 1997 Notice of Modification seeks to provide an intelligible definition. The agency has
established a two-tiered approach to assessing superior environmental
performance that examines both quantitative and qualitative
factors. 352
Tier 1 represents a quantitative benchmark. The benchmark
would represent a comparison between the load to the environment
that would take place with, and without, an XL proposal,353 These
benchmarks may be based on a per-unit of production basis or on a
comparable measure such as the volume of liquid hazardous waste
generated by each product. 354 Except in unusual circumstances, an
applicant would not receive credit for measures that the applicant had
already implemented voluntarily and that would remain in place absent the Project XL process. 355 In addition, the agency seeks to incorporate pollution prevention principles by taking into account any
reductions in the use of toxic chemicals or natural resources as inputs
into the production process. 356
The agency will examine the impact of a proposal on environmental loading in each of the three environmental media, but will consider projects that increase pollution in one medium in exchange for
lower amounts in another medium "where there is a demonstrable net
benefit to public health and the environment."357 Because it is difficult to precisely measure the tradeoffs among environmental loadings
in different media, EPA will require projects to establish, "with an
350. XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,287; see Ginsberg & Cummis,
supra note 91, at 10,061.
351. See White House Official Says, supra note 147, at 1246 (reporting remarks at Sept.
25, 1996 forum by David Rejeski, spokesman for the White House Office of Science and
Technology).
352. See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,874.
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id.
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adequate margin of safety, overall superior environmental performance over what would be achieved absent XL."358 The agency will not
approve projects that threaten ecological health or risk-based environmental standards, such as water quality standards under the Clean
Water Act. 359 However, as Part 1I.C.2.a will discuss, the agency will
allow applicants to make tradeoffs among different pollutants that
contribute to a single environmental problem or among different loadings that contribute to pollution in different media.
As part of its Tier II analysis, the EPA will make a qualitative
assessment of whether a project achieves "superior" environmental
performance, although the agency will seek to quantify its weighing of
factors wherever possible. 360 In addition to examining issues such as
environmental loadings or pollution prevention reductions, the agency
will examine "the extent to which the project substantially addresses
community and public health priorities of concern to stakeholders,"
including issues such as employee safety or community health patterns
that the agency has no authority to regulate. 361 Furthermore, the
agency will evaluate the extent to which the applicant will be accountable for actually achieving its goals through either enforceable or voluntary commitments and will assess the firm's past environmental
record as a guide to future performance. 362 In unusual cases, EPA
may give credit to an applicant for its pre-existing voluntary
measures. 363
b.

Stakeholder Involvement

The EPA's May 23, 1995 Federal Register notice defining the XL
program emphasized that, in deciding whether to approve a project,
the agency would strongly consider "the extent to which project proponents have sought and achieved the support of parties that have a
stake in the environmental impacts of the project."364 The definition
of "stakeholder" included both local community groups interested in
the immediate impacts of a project, and state, regional, and national
organizations concerned with the broader implications of the concepts
tested in a particular project. 365 Nevertheless, many commentators
criticized the agency for failing to require that community groups participate in the crucial early stages of a project or to provide adequate
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
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See
See
See
See
See
XL
See

id.
id.
id. at 19,875.
id.
id. at 19,875-76.
id. at 19,876.
Pilot Projects, supra note 91, 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,287.
id.; XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,877.
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resources for meaningful participation by local citizen
organiza tions. 366
The EPA's April 23, 1997 Notice of Modification organizes stakeholders into three broad categories and provides a distinct role for
each group: first, "direct participants" are involved from the early
stages of developing a Project XL proposal and have the opportunity
to influence the project's details and the agency's ultimate approval or
disapproval; second, "informed commentors" can express their views
on specific issues without participating intensely in the project's development; and third, the general public has easy access to information
during the project's development and implementation. 367 While these
three categories of stakeholders are important, the agency emphasizes
the paramount importance of the project sponsors and "strongly encourages firms and established non-governmental organizations to
partner as co-sponsors of XL projects. "368 For instance, a state citizens' group could serve as a co-sponsor of a project and thereby gain a
role in the project that is quite distinct from the three categories of
stakeholders. 369 Stakeholders may initiate a proposal, but EPA will
consider a formal proposal only if a facility owner or operator voluntarily participates. 37o Accordingly, project sponsors normally play the
key role in defining the scope of a project. 371 Furthermore, EPA
places much of the responsibility for involving direct participants and
commentors on the project sponsors. 372
When project sponsors submit a proposal, EPA and state environmental agencies initially decide whether it is within the scope of
the XL program. Then, if appropriate, they conduct a full review of
the proposaP73 After conducting a review and informally receiving
comments from stakeholders who are aware of the initial proposal,
EPA responds to the proposal with both initial findings and questions,
along with any stakeholder comments, and transmits them to project
sponsors and to the general public through its Project XL site on the
Internet's World Wide Web. 374 The EPA expects that project sponsors will consult with various stakeholders, especially direct participants, when the sponsors develop their response to the agency's
questions. 375 After reviewing the sponsors' response EPA decides
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

See generally infra Part II.C.2.h.
See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,877-78.
See id. at 19,878.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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See id.
See id.
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 66 1998-1999

REGULATORY REFORM AND EPA

1998]

67

whether a proposal should proceed as an XL project and posts its decision on the Web site. 376
Once EPA allows a proposal to be described as an XL project,
the sponsors must develop the project into a final project agreement
that the agency can approve. 377 It is the responsibility of the sponsors
to achieve a final project agreement by negotiating with EPA, states,
and various stakeholders, by inviting responses from commentors and
by informing the general public. 378
The April 23, 1997 Notice of Modification grants the project
sponsor the primary role in recruiting potential direct participants and
commentors, but strongly encourages sponsors to seek stakeholders
from economically disadvantaged groups and national environmental
justice organizations. 379 Project sponsors retain significant discretion
in deciding the size and composition of the direct participant group,
although the knowledge that EPA will take into account the adequacy
of public involvement in deciding whether to approve a proposal
places some constraints on project sponsors. 380 The Notice of Modification allows the project sponsor and direct participants authority to
decide the ground rules for stakeholder involvement, including the
level of authority vested in direct participant stakeholders, whether
advisory, consultative, or decision-making. 381 In addition, the project
sponsor and direct participants will determine whether a third-party
facilitator/mediator is desirable. The EPA "encourages" but does not
require the "use of neutral, local third-party facilitators."382
The EPA allows sponsors and direct participants significant discretion in setting ground rules for the role of direct participant stakeholders because the agency believes that there is no single stakeholder
model that fits all the circumstances affecting a particular XL project.383 The Notice of Modification, however, does contain some provisions promoting participation by members of the general public or
local environmental groups in the direct participant negotiation process. The EPA will evaluate an XL proposal in part based upon the
extent to which the project sponsor has assembled a diverse group of
direct participants. 384 The agency strongly encourages, but does not
require, the project sponsor to provide training to direct partici376.
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pants.385 The EPA also promised to make its own expertise available
to direct participants throughout the project development process. 386
Furthermore, after environmentalists criticized the agency for
failing to provide direct participants with the resources needed to
evaluate complex projects,387 EPA announced that it would make
available up to $25,000 per project to provide technical assistance to
support meaningful stakeholder involvement. 388 These grants will not
be made directly to individuals or groups of stakeholders, but will be
paid to identified experts for a specific assistance activity.389 Individual stakeholders may not request the provision of technical assistance;
only the direct participant stakeholder group acting as a whole may
seek such assistance. Further, they may do so only after exploring the
use of local resources. 390 The EPA emphasized the need to minimize
the cost of technical assistance grants by the use of "appropriate financial management controls" and the use of innovative, cost-saving approaches such as cooperative or partnership agreements with state or
local regulatory agencies, private firms, trade associations, non-profit
organizations, or other interested parties who are willing to provide
resources to neutral third parties who would carry out technical assistance requests. 391
The EPA also encourages project sponsors and direct participants
to develop ground rules for communicating with commentors and the
general public. 392 The agency itself will facilitate such communication
by disseminating information to the general public through the Internet's World Wide Web. 393 The agency will post updated drafts of
project agreements and other relevant information on its Web site and
also will use its Web site to notify commentors directly of the availability of reviewable material.394 In addition, EPA will convey any
comments received by the agency to the project sponsor, direct participants, and the state environmental agency and EPA will respond
itself and for the record to significant comments from national environmental and environmental justice organizations. 395
The project sponsor will submit a "Final Project Agreement" to
EPA for its review after the direct participants conclude their stake385.
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holder meetings and, if they have decisionmaking authority, vote on
the proposed agreement. 396 The EPA will post a copy of the final
draft on its Web site, indicate on the Web site that the agency is circulating this draft within the agency for formal concurrence, and convene, at the request of a project sponsor, direct participant
stakeholder or commentor, a meeting of these groups to discuss the
project and provide feedback.397 The appropriate state environmental
agency must approve the Agreement, but a state's support does not
obligate EPA to agree. 398 The EPA asserts its authority to approve
ultimately or to disapprove an XL project and will not be bound by
the views of any stakeholder group.399 Nonetheless, the agency emphasizes that it will carefully consider the views of stakeholders, especially those of direct participants who have acquired a thorough
knowledge of a project.400
Once EPA has approved a proposal, the agency will post the proposed agreement on its Web site and notify commentors about the
availability of reviewable materia1. 401 In addition, the agency will
publish in the Federal Register a notice of the availability of the proposal and instructions for receiving a copy.402 Furthermore, in appropriate cases in which an agreement appears to conflict with an existing
regulation, the agency will publish a separate notice inviting public
comment about any site-specific rule making associated with a proposal that would allow the sponsor to deviate from existing regulations.403 After receiving comments from the public, the project
sponsor, state environmental agency, and direct participant stakeholders, EPA will post its response to significant comments on the Web
site and make its final decision whether to approve the proposa1. 404
Once the agency approves an XL project, the sponsors implement the
project and EPA monitors and evaluates its success in light of voluntary and mandatory requirements in the Agreement.40S
C.

Proposals for Alleviating Concerns About Integration

Any attempt at reforming Project XL and similar multimedia initiatives should address environmentalists' legitimate concerns about
integrating meaningful public participation and public health concerns
396. See
397. See
398. See
399. See
400. See
401. See
402. See
403. See
404. See
405. See
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into these regulatory relief programs. The previous section of this Article illustrated EPA's efforts to address these concerns; but those efforts are inadequate. Part II.C proposes a comprehensive statute that
provides industry with protection from liability as long as it follows
legislative parameters, addresses environmentalists' integration concerns, and ensures public participation.
1.

General Requirements for Implementing Responsible Reform

The proposed statute would necessarily be somewhat general in
nature because it would apply to a broad range of environmental activities and regulations; but it would have several safeguards to ensure
public participation and protect the public health from the hazards
inherent in comparative risk assessment. The statute would contain
clear instructions as to how a permitting agency should conduct stakeholder negotiations and hold a public hearing before approving a project. Thus, there would be careful attention to protecting the role of
public participation, including vulnerable minority groups. The statute would describe the instances in which cross-pollutant or cross-media trading is acceptable, and the type of information that an applicant
would have to produce to protect the public health. All participants
would publish an annual report discussing the impact of their alternative compliance and trading programs on the environment, including
any special implications for vulnerable minority groups. Finally, the
statute would require EPA to review regional, state, and tribal permitting decisions for national consistency and fairness. The proposed
statute would have to be both general enough to cover a broad range
of environmental issues and media and detailed enough to safeguard
the public health and environment. This specificity would enable the
proposed statute to function more effectively than either NEPA or
TSCA.
2.

Proposals for Responsible Reform

a.

Cross-Media and Cross-Pollutant Trading

i. Deficiencies of EPA's Solution
In discussing the quantitative "Tier I" benchmark, the April 23,
1997 Notice of Modification allows applicants to make tradeoffs
among different pollutants that contribute to a single environmental
problem. 406 In addition, the agency authorizes tradeoffs among different loadings that contribute to pollution in different media. 407 The
Notice of Modification provides some answers about the extent to
which cross-media or cross-pollutant trading is acceptable, but it
406.
407.

See id. at 19,874.
See id.
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leaves too many questions unanswered. Congress should provide further guidance to the agency about the extent to which a firm may
average different types of pollutants or increase the risk in one medium if there is an expected reduction in multimedia risk.
The Notice of Modification does not directly or fully address all
the issues related to the trading of different carcinogens, the trading of
noncarcinogens for carcinogens, or the averaging of different loadings
across different media. For example, EPA uses the substitution of two
noncarcinogens, Volatile Organic Compounds for Nitrogen Oxides,
that contribute to a single environmental outcome, the formation of
smog. 408 In evaluating these tradeoffs, the applicant must examine
how a reduction or increase in a related pollutant will affect unrelated
health or environmental issues. For instance, VOCs may not only contribute to smog formation, but also may contain hazardous air pollutants that are carcinogens. 409 The Notice of Modification also allows
tradeoffs among different loadings that contribute to pollution in different media "where there is a demonstrable net benefit to public
health and the environment."410 For example, an applicant might propose waste minimization technology that reduces hazardous waste incineration, but also increases waterborne pollutant discharges. 411
The April 23, 1997 Notice of Modification stated that the agency
would not approve projects that create a shifting of risk burden such
as the diversion of hazardous air pollutant emissions from stacks affecting the surrounding community to the work area, or that raise environmental justice issues such as reducing the net level of
remediation at a waste disposal site in a low-income community.412 In
its May 23, 1995 Notice, EPA had defined "shifting of risk burden" to
mean that a "project must be consistent with Executive Order 12,898
on Environmental Justice. It must protect worker safety and ensure
that no one is subjected to unjust or disproportionate environmental
impacts."413 Neither the original Notice nor the Notice of Modification attempt to provide a precise definition of the complex issues surrounding the meaning of "environmental justice" or "worker safety."
ii. Proposal for Reform of Cross-Trading
Congress should enact some additional requirements for crossmedia or cross-pollutant averaging. A statute could establish a presumption that trades are allowed only if they reduce releases to the
408.
409.
410.
411.
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413.
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more environmentally sensitive medium. The EPA should establish a
rule that trading must reduce releases to the more environmentally
sensitive medium unless the applicant can show by clear and convincing evidence that its proposal will reduce overall risks despite an increase to a more environmentally sensitive medium. For example, the
trading rules might allow air decreases to be exchanged for roughly
equivalent water or land waste increases, water decreases to be substituted for similar land waste increases, and prohibit land waste increases unless industry could provide a detailed risk assessment
justifying the exchange. 414
In addition, the proposed statute would require an applicant to
justify any trade involving different carcinogens, or a carcinogen and a
noncarcinogen, by demonstrating that the trade is more likely than
not to decrease the total risk of cancer or only to increase the total
risk to the surrounding population by a de minimis amount, which environmental agencies usually define as less than a one-in-one-million
increase in the lifetime risk of cancer. 415 The applicant should pay for
this assessment because it gains the benefits of trading and because
Congress is unlikely to provide sufficient funds for EPA to accomplish
rigorous testing. In any trading that involves highly toxic or ecologically damaging chemicals, an applicant should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the potential damage trading may cause to
ecosystems, how the different mix of chemicals may affect their ability
to bioaccumulate, and their harm not just to the immediate area
around a facility, but also to broader geographic areas. 416 Furthermore, an applicant should investigate how trading would affect the
amount of chemicals that would reach racial or cultural minorities. 417
Congress should also provide more guidance and democratic debate about the meaning of "shifting the risk burden." Is it ever appropriate to increase the risk of one type of cancer if a tradeoff between
different chemicals or releases into different media will reduce the
overall risk of cancer?418 Are tradeoffs in risks to different population
groups such as consumers and workers ever appropriate if the overall
risk is significantly smaller?419 It is not surprising that EPA does not
414. See Pederson, supra note 326, at 10,490.
415. See generally Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16,332 (observing that environmental agencies typically seek to achieve a lifetime cancer risk of less than one·in-amillion), but see id. at 281-88.
416. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,53l.
417. See Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,531; see generally Mank, Exception Process, supra
note 16, at 281-88, 336-37.
418. See generally Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regutation on
the paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG 369, 441
(1993). (discussing problems with comparing risks in different subpopulations).
419. See id.
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fully address these sensitive issues. Only Congress has the democratic
legitimacy to address the hard questions involved in shifting risk burdens, but in light of its fragmented structure and propensity to delegate difficult health issues to agencies, Congress is unlikely to confront
such dilemmas. 42o Even if Congress does not deal with the problem of
risk shifting, the proposed statute should provide better guidance to
EPA and Project XL sponsors about the permissible limits of crossmedia and cross-pollutant trading.

b.
1.

Protecting Public Participation
The Deficiency of EPA's Selection of Stakeholders

The Notice of Modification gives project sponsors too much discretion in selecting direct participants despite encouraging sponsors to
select at least some direct participants from among low-income or national environmental justice groups.421 The amount of discretion that
project sponsors possess in selecting direct participants is disturbing
because direct participants enjoy greater opportunities than mere
commentors or the general public in shaping a proposal during its crucial early stages. 422 During the early stages of a typical Project XL,
only direct participants attend meetings defining the scope of a project. 423 Furthermore, only direct participants are entitled to receive
technical assistance grants from EPA.424 There is a huge difference
between commenting on a completed project and directly participating in creating it.
According to the Notice of Modification, EPA may reject a project if the agency is dissatisfied with how a sponsor has selected direct
participants;425 but, as a practical matter, the agency is likely to exercise its veto only in extreme cases in which a sponsor has deliberately
excluded important community groups. In most cases, if a sponsor
includes some community groups but excludes others as "redundant,"
the agency will be unlikely to reject a proposal that otherwise meets
the agency's criteria. Accordingly, project sponsors can wield enormous power by selecting community groups that are more likely to
favor the sponsor's viewpoint and by excluding those that may be less
amenable to industry's positions. The Notice of Modification fails to
provide adequate guarantees that sponsors will select likely project
opponents as direct participants even though such groups may be bet420. See supra Part 1.C.2.
421. See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,878-79.
422. See supra Part I.B.2.d.
423. See XL modification, supra note 95, at 19,878-79.
424. See id.
425. See id.
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ter able to point out a project's deficiencies than the groups that sponsors would prefer.
Industry might argue that a sponsor ought to be able to exclude a
group that is so clearly opposed to a project that it does not have an
open mind on the subject. Any danger of obstructionism can be minimized, however, if EPA or a relevant state agency selects a diverse
group of direct participants and the group operates under majority
voting rules. If a group is obviously hindering progress, the majority
can refuse to accede to unreasonable requests. There might even be
procedures for removing a direct participant if a supermajority of the
other direct participants, perhaps three-fourths, petitions the appropriate agency and justifies why the extraordinary remedy of exclusion
is appropriate.
In addition, the Notice of Modification effectively allows project
sponsors to determine procedural ground rules. The Notice of Modification grants the project sponsor and direct participants the authority to decide the ground rules for stakeholder involvement, including
the level of authority vested in direct participant stakeholders,
whether advisory, consultative, or decisionmaking.'1-26 As a practical
matter, sponsors are unlikely to cede decisionmaking power to direct
participants and will try to select direct participants who are willing to
yield most authority to the sponsor. Even if a sponsor selects a few
visible opponents as direct participants, a sponsor is likely to ensure
that a majority of direct participants will select an advisory or consultative approach favorable to the sponsor. 427 While EPA is probably
correct that direct participants do not need to possess decisionmaking
authority over every XL project, allowing project sponsors to handpick direct participants with minimal oversight by the agency will
likely prevent any project sponsor from giving direct participants decision-making authority. The EPA, a state agency or another neutral
party ought to select direct participants.
Finally, the Notice of Modification gives the project sponsor too
much discretion to decide whether mediation is appropriate. Under
the Notice of Modification, the project sponsor and direct participants
will determine whether a third-party facilitator/mediator is desirable;
EPA "encourages" but does not require the "use of neutral, local
third-party facilitators. "428 Because mediation can be expensive and
time consuming,429 most project sponsors will likely oppose its use
426. See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,879.
427. See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,879.
428. Id.
429. See Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster?, 19 B.c.
ENVTL. AFr. L. REV. 239, 279-80 (1991).
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even if the process might facilitate a dialogue with community groups.
The use of mediation does not guarantee that community groups will
be able to bargain equally with industry. However, if a facilitator
helps weaker participants to understand better the issues at stake, mediation may create a more equal playing ground among groups with
vastly different resources and technical knowledge. 430 Another factor
may make mediation less likely to succeed. Sponsors are unlikely to
select direct participants that would threaten the sponsors dominant
role in the project. While mediation is not a panacea for solving environmental problems,431 independent direct participants who are not
hand-picked by the sponsor ought to decide whether third-party facilitation is appropriate to improve public participation in an XL project.
ii. Proposal for Ensuring Proper Stakeholder Involvement

The EPA's approach does not sufficiently protect the public's interest in having a wide range of groups participate in the development
of proposals. Instead of allowing sponsors to select direct participants, Congress should require that EPA or a designated state or tribal permitting authority playa significant role in assembling a diverse
group of stakeholders to serve as direct participants in the development of the proposal. There are several ways to select the members of
the stakeholders group, especially direct participants. Congress could
specify the types of people who should be selected, including technical
experts, local politicians, or members of community or public interest
groups. Alternatively, Congress could delegate this decision to EPA
to fit individual circumstances. Furthermore, the statute might require that the local community elect a certain percentage of the direct
participant members. In addition, Congress might give larger voting
rights to those most exposed to risk from the facility or require the use
of proportional voting techniques that enhance the ability of racial or
ethnic minorities to win a seat on the direct participants' group.432 As
a practical matter, there probably should be some limit on the size of
direct participants group, perhaps at most twenty members, to allow
for meaningful discussions and negotiations. 433
In addition, Congress should determine at least some of the
ground rules for the relationship between sponsors and direct participants. Congress should not give any individual direct participant a
veto over the process because that individual or group may not suffi430. See id.
431. See id.
432. See Mank, Risk-Based Representation, supra note 103, at 410-19 (proposing riskbased representation on local siting boards and discussing the use of proportional voting
techniques to enhance minority representation).
433. See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,879.
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ciently represent the public interest. It may be appropriate in some
cases, however, to give high risk residents a weighted vote that is
greater than those at lower risk. Congress should create a strong presumption that EPA will reject any proposal if a majority of direct participants opposes the project; the agency on its own would likely come
to the same result.
The more difficult issue is ensuring thorough discussion of issues
and meaningful participation by a wide range of groups without making the process unnecessarily burdensome. In theory, the presence of
a neutral, third-party facilitator could help to assure that all direct participants have a meaningful opportunity to participate. On the other
hand, some commentators argue that the use of facilitators does not
usually address fundamental differences in power or knowledge
among different parties. 434 Because some sponsors and direct participants may work well together without the need for a neutral, thirdparty facilitator, industry would likely argue that mandatory mediation is unnecessarily coercive and expensive. The EPA's encouragement, but not requirement, of the use of third-party facilitators is
reasonable. 435
Nevertheless, Congress could foster the use of appropriate mediation by providing EPA with money to train a pool of facilitators to be
sensitive to concerns such as environmental justice and health. If
EPA has a stake in training mediators it will be more likely to encourage their use. Altbough use of a third-party facilitator can improve each participant's understanding of other parties, a mediator
cannot normally eliminate the unequal bargaining power caused by
financial or informational disparities. 436 Accordingly, the presence of
a mediator is not a substitute for providing one or more stakeholder
groups with a technical assistance grant that would allow them or the
agency to hire an independent expert to assess both the applicant's
proposal and, to a limited extent, the agency's evaluation.
To encourage meaningful participation by low-income and national environmental justice groups, Congress should require that all
XL Final Project Agreements examine both the health and social impacts that may reasonably be attributed to the project. For large
projects having significant environmental and social impacts, the statute would require the sponsor, in conjunction with the direct participants, to write a fifteen to twenty-five page assessment similar to an
Environmental Assessment under the National Environmental Policy
Act, but not as extensive as a lengthy Environmental Impact State434.
435.
436.

See, e.g., Mank, Mediation, supra note 429, at 279-80.
See XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,879.
See Mank, Risk-Based Representation, supra note 103, at 408.
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ment. 437 Under NEPA, agencies usually must address social impacts
that directly arise from a project's environmental impacts, but need
not evaluate more indirect or diffuse social consequences. 438 A similar standard would apply to a sponsor's Project XL application as a
means to require adequate discussion of socio-economic impacts without burdening sponsors with tangential issues. In light of Executive
Order 12,898's requirement that federal agencies address concerns
about environmental justice, however, an applicant should discuss the
extent to which its project may adversely affect minorities or low-income residents even if its proposal would only marginally add to an
existing disparity problem. 439
iii. Deficiencies in EPA's Approach to Technical Assistance Grants
The EPA's proposals for training and small technical assistance
grants (TAG) of up to $25,000 for XL project are positive steps, but
do not go far enough to redress the limited funds most local community groups have at their disposal compared to what industry will in
many cases spend on experts. Furthermore, the agency's restriction of
grants to requests by the entire group of direct participants would prevent individual direct participants from requesting grants that might
address important concerns and may especially harm low-income and
national environmental justice groups the agency claims it wants to
encourage to participate in the Project XL process. The EPA's requirement that the agency directly hire and pay neutral, third-party
experts rather than allowing direct participants to select or pay their
437. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 7.10-7.11 (1984 &
1991 Supp.) (discussing "environmental assessments" and "environmental impact
statements").
438. See generally id. at §§ 8.35-8.46.
439. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,898, S9 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) (requiring federal
agencies to consider whether environmental regulations or actions disproportionately affect poor people or racial minority groups); Mank, Risk-Based Representation, supra note
103, at 334-44 (reviewing empirical evidence regarding whether environmental inequities
exist concerning various racial minority groups and the poor). The Environmental Appeals Board has held that EPA has discretionary authority pursuant to its omnibus authority within certain statutes to go beyond the public participation requirements in 40 CF.R.
Part 124 to address environmental justice issues. See In re: Envotech, L.P., 1996 WL 66307
(EPA 1996) at 14 (holding that EPA has authority under the Safe Drinking Water Act's
Underground Injection Control regulations, 40 CF.R. 4, 144.52(a)(9), to provide additional public comment to address environmental justice issues); In re Chemical Waste Management of Indiana, Inc., 1995 WL 395962 (EPA 1995), at 5-6 (holding EPA has authority
under 40 C.F.R pt. 124 to provide additional public participation opportunities and has
authority under RCRA's omnibus clause, § 300S(c)(3), 42 U.S.C § 6925(c)(3), to add additional permit conditions to address health concerns that threaten low income or minority
communities). In addition, EPA has modified RCRA's public participation requirements
to provide earlier opportunities for public involvement, even before an applicant submits a
permit application, to make it easier for the public to raise environmental justice concerns.
See 60 Fed. Reg. 63,417, 63,420-21 (1995).
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own experts is somewhat questionable, but the agency does have legitimate concerns about maintaining tight control of monies and
preventing potential conflicts of interest.
One must be somewhat skeptical of how EPA is likely to implement its TAG program for Project XL based on its history with similar
programs. For instance, CERCLA section 117(e) provides for technical assistance grants of up to $50,000 for any group or individual affected by a release or threatened release at any abandoned hazardous
waste facility that is listed on the National Priorities List under the
National Contingency Plan. 440 The EPA, however, has awarded relatively few grants under this statute. 441 The General Accounting Office
has criticized the program's administrative requirements for being
overly burdensome442 and by its own admission the agency has made
it difficult for local citizens or environmental groups to win these
grants because of unnecessary "restrictions, complexity, costs, and red
tape. "443 For instance, the application must contain a three-year itemized budget and a detailed scope of work narrative. 444 In addition,
community groups must ordinarily supply matching funds of twenty
percent of the total grant unless they obtain a waiver. 445 Community
organizations must also meet a number of administrative requirements, including being an incorporated nonprofit organization and filing quarterly progress reports and yearly financial reports. 446
In theory, EPA's process for evaluating grant applications is fair,
but the agency imposes too many complex demands on community
organizations that cannot afford to file sophisticated applications. The
agency evaluates grant applications based on a five-criteria, weighted
100 point scoring system that includes: 1) the site's risk (thirty points);
2) the applicant's ability to represent the public (twenty points); 3)
440. See 42 u.s.c. § 9617(e) (1997); 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.4000-35.4130.
441. See Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Expanding Public Participation in the Federal Superfund "Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
671, 679 (1994) ("a mere 119 grants have been awarded for over 1200 NPL sites.").
442. See GAO, EPA's Superfund TAG Program: Grants Benefit Citizens but Administrative Barriers Remain (Nov. 1992); EPA's Superfund TAG Program: Grants Benefit Citizens but Administrative Barriers Remain: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations
and Oversight of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1992) (statement of Richard L. Hembra, General Accounting Office); Ferris, supra note
441, at 678-79.
443. 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES &
SUBSTANCES § 8.9.C.3.b, 617-18 n.133 (1992) (quoting 1989 EPA Superfund Management
Rev. at 5-16); see also Ellison Folk, Public Participation in the Superfund Cleanup Process,
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173, 199 n.175 (1991) (discussing restrictions on TAG grants).
444. See Ferris, supra note 441, at 679-80.
445. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.4085(a) (20% matching fund requirement), 35.4090(b) (waiver
provision).
446. See 40 C.F.R §§ 35.4020(b) (TAG recipient must be incorporated nonprofit organization), 35.4110(a)-(b) (requiring quarterly progress and yearly financial reports).
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how the group plans to use its proposed technical advisor (twenty
points); 4) the ability of the applicant to inform the public (twenty
points); and 5) the economic or environmental threat the site poses to
group members (twenty points).447 While these criteria are reasonable in theory, it is often difficult for community groups to address
complex issues such as a site's risk or economic impacts without a
technical advisor, placing them in a classic Catch 22 situation: they
may not be able to get a grant for a technical advisor unless they have
a technical advisor to fill out the application. 448
If EPA provides a grant, another burdensome requirement for
community groups with small budgets is that the agency does not give
a lump-sum grant to successful applicants, but instead reimburses
them for their actual expenses, which means the group must submit
receipts before being reimbursed. 449 Alternatively, EPA should provide an up-front grant to a group and should cap any administrative
costs claimed by a recipient and require a recipient to submit receipts
to prevent recipients from adopting a "blank check" mentality. This
procedure would lessen the administrative burden on poorly funded
environmental groups and control the costs of the TAG program.
iv. Proposal for Proper Technical Assistance Grants
To allow for meaningful participation by all direct participants,
Congress should either provide for significantly larger public funding
than $25,000 for each project or require that industry pay for part or
all of such technical assistance grants to direct participant stakeholders so EPA or a community group can hire independent experts to
assess the applicant's proposa1. 450 In addition, the proposed statute
would allow individual direct participants to request technical assistance grants to study the impact of an XL project on particular ethnic,
racial, or income groups, or local communities if there is plausible evidence to believe that there may be an impact on such a group that is
different in degree or kind than on the general population, or to disseminate information to the public. 451 Furthermore, EPA needs to
simplify the grant application process to make it accessible to local
community groups. The statute might incorporate elements of the
EPA scoring system for awarding grants, but also direct EPA to pro447. See id. at 35.4035(a)-(5) (listing five criteria).
448. See Ferris, supra note 441, at 679; see generally JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH 22 (1955)
(regarding the absurdity of war and circular bureaucratic requirements).
449. See 40 CF.R. § 35.4080; Ferris, supra note 441, at 682.
450. See Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 340-41 (proposing either EPA or
industry provide technical assistance grants to allow public interest groups to hire technical
experts); Steinzor, supra note 8, at 10,535; see supra Part I.C3. (discussing issue of agency
capture).
451. See XL Modification, supra note 95, at 19,879, supra note 95, at 19,880.
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financial resources to

v. Deficiencies in EPA's Provision for Public Hearings
The April 23, 1997 Notice of Modification states that EPA will
publish in the Federal Register a notice of availability regarding draft
final project agreements and any proposed site-specific rulemaking associated with an agreement. It also directs EPA to provide an opportunity for public comment, but does not require the agency to hold a
public hearing regarding these agreements. 452 As a matter of practice,
however, EPA has given the public the opportunity to request public
hearings when the agency has promulgated site-specific rules for a facility or announced draft final project agreements.
The submission of public comments in response to a notice in the
Federal Register or a posting on EPA's Project XL web site can allow
commentors to raise some concerns, but does not permit citizens to
interact with each other in the same room, present their concerns
face-to-face, or cross-examine industry or EPA experts. On the other
hand, public hearings can be quite costly and time consuming for both
the agency and industry. A possible compromise solution would provide for the submission of written comments by the public and then
would allow agency staff to cross-examine the industry on behalf of
the commentor, which is a common practice when public comments
are received about an environmental impact statement (EIS) written
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act. 453
Currently, different environmental statutes and regulations have
different requirements for public hearings and the use of formal administrative procedures. During the late 1970s, some courts interpreted the reference to a "hearing" in Section 402(a) of the Clean
Water Act to require formal administrative hearings if an interested
party requested such a hearing, despite the absence of an explicit
mandate in the statute. 454 As a result, EPA in 1979 promulgated the
current Part 124 regulations requiring the agency to provide upon re452. See Site-Specific Rulemaking, supra note 117,62 Fed. Reg. 15,304; EPA, Project
for HADCO Corporation, supra note 116, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3,508.
453. NEPA does not require that agencies provide for cross-examination of agency
personnel responsible for drafting an EIS. See 40 c.F.R. § 1506.6 (listing public involvement requirements for NEPA). Nevertheless, agencies are generally free to impose additional procedural requirements on themselves and Congress may impose "hybrid"
rulemaking procedures, including cross-examination, although courts may not impose procedures beyond those required by statute. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
454. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 877 (1st Cir. 1978);
Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 1977); United States Steel Corp.
v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 833 (7th Cir. 1977); Amendments to Streamline the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program Regulations; Round Two, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,268,
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quest a formal evidentiary hearing under Section 554 of the Administrative Procedure's Act for any NPDES permit decision to grant,
deny, or terminate a permit for cause. 455 These requirements apply
only to permit decisions conducted by EPA officials; states and tribes
are not required to conduct formal adjudicatory hearings. 456 In addition, formal adjudicatory procedures apply to a decision to terminate
a permit for a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility
issued under Section 3005 of RCRA.457 By contrast, permits issued or
denied under RCRA Subtitle C, the Underground Injection Control
(VIC) program of Part C of the Safe Drinking Water Act, or the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program under Part C, Title I of the Clean Air Act, do not require formal "on the record"
hearings unless such permits have been consolidated for purposes of
permit issuance with an NPDES permit for which the agency has
granted an evidentiary hearing. 458
The EPA has recently proposed to eliminate formal evidentiary
hearings for issuance or denial of NPDES permits under the Clean
Water Act because the agency believes they are not required by the
Act, and that such procedures are not needed to protect the due process rights of permittees or other interested parties. 459 The EPA contends that court decisions from the 1970s requiring formal
adjudicatory hearings are no longer good law in light of more recent
cases that require such procedures only if a statute explicitly mandates
them.460 In addition, the agency maintains that formal hearings are
not needed to protect the due process rights of permittees or other
interested parties under Mathews v. Eldridge's461 three-part-test for
deciding which administrative procedures are required by the due pro65,276 (1996) (discussing Clean Water Act's requirement for formal adjudicatory procedures) [hereinafter Amendments to Streamline].
455. See 40 C.F.R. part 124 §§ .71-.91 (subpart E); Amendments to Streamline, supra
note 454, at 65,276; 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,855 (June 7, 1979); see generally Gilbert M.
Zemansky & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Adjudicatory Hearings as Part of the NPDES Permit
Process, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1980).
456. See 40 C.F.R. § 123.25 (1997); Amendments to Streamline, supra note 454, at
65,281; Zemansky & Zerbe, Jr., supra note 455, at 3.
457. See Amendments to Streamline, supra note 454, at 65,276; 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.71,
270.43 (1997).
458. See Amendments to Streamline, supra note 454, at 65,276; 40 C.F.R. § 124.71(a).
459. See Amendments to Streamline, supra note 454, at 65,276. The EPA would continue to hold formal adjudicatory hearings in those rare cases in which it terminates an
NPDES or RCRA permit. See id. at 65,279 n.3.
460. See Amendments to Streamline, supra note 454, at 65,276-77; Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that amendments to RCRA § 3008 do not require formal adjudicatory hearings); Buttrey v. United
States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1174-76 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding Clean Water Act § 404 does not
require formal adjudicatory hearings).
461. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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cess clause. 462 As a matter of policy, EPA argues that formal evidentiary hearings are too time-consuming, taking an average of eighteen
to twenty-one months to resolve, including completion of the appeals
process, and have led to significant delays in the issuance of permitS.463 By contrast, informal appeals for NPDES, RCRA or Safe
Drinking Water Act permits average under nine months. 464 Furthermore, in only twenty percent of the cases for which the agency has
data did the formal evidentiary hearing and appeals process result in a
modification of the permit, and in only one case did the hearing itself
result in the modification. 465 In most cases, any modification of the
permit results from informal settlement negotiations between the Regional Office and the permittee. 466 Because of the lengthy formal
hearing process and the greater prospects for success through informal
negotiations, even when an interested party requests an evidentiary
hearing, the party usually withdraws its request, settles the issues without a hearing, or the EPA regional administrator denies the request
for a hearing. 467 Thus, EPA contends that eliminating formal adjudicatory hearings would save time and money468 and would not significantly weaken the due process rights of permittees and other
interested parties. 469
A related issue is what procedures are appropriate when a project
sponsor considers new activities that may be a significant departure
from the final project agreement with EPA. On January 24, 1997,
Maryann Froelich, Director of EPA's Office of Policy development,
issued a Memorandum on New Activities and Significant Departures
in XL Projects After Project Selection. 470 According to the Memorandum, "Where the new activity is not a significant departure from
the original proposal, the issue need not be turned formally back to
the EPA."471 The agency warns, however, that the sponsors should
document that a change is not significant. The Memorandum suggests
that an activity is more likely to be regarded as insignificant "where
the proposed activity was in some fashion referenced in the original

462. 424 U.s. 319, 334-35 (1976). See also Amendments to Streamline, supra note 454
at 65,277.
463. See Amendments to Streamline, supra note 454, at 65,278.
464. See id.
465. See id.
466. See id.
467. See id. at 65,277-78.
468. See id.
469. See id. at 65,276.
470. See Memorandum from Maryann Froelich, Director, Office of Policy Development, U.S. EPA 3 (last visited Jan. 24, 1997) <http://199.223.29.233/xl_home/
xl_depar.html>.
471. [d. at 2.
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proposal
."472 It is understandable that EPA does not wish to
subject insignificant changes to a lengthy review process. The danger,
however, is that there is no public review process to allow challenges
to what the sponsor considers to be an insignificant change.
For significant departures, the Memorandum discusses three possible procedures. For less controversial changes, the EPA administrator in charge of Project XL, then the Assistant Administrator for
Policy, Planning and Evaluation and currently the Associate Administrator for the Office of Reinvention, would concur with the addition.473 Second, the sponsor could submit the new activity to the
formal agency-wide selection process; this would make most sense if a
sponsor wished to replicate an existing project at a totally separate
facility.474 Third, in "rare cases," the sponsor may wish to resubmit
the original proposal as well as the new activity to the XL selection
process. 475 For instance, if a new activity fundamentally changed the
nature of a project and posed a "serious controversy" then it would
remain unclear whether the project remained consistent with the original selection criteria and EPA would treat both the existing project
and new activity as a new proposa1. 476 Implicitly, the Memorandum
gives the project sponsor, in conjunction with EPA and relevant state
environmental agencies, considerable discretion in deciding which of
these three procedures is appropriate in a given case.
VI.

Proposal for Ensuring Adequate Public Hearings

The proposed statute would provide for a right to a public hearing in certain limited circumstances. Congress should take into consideration the stakeholder negotiation process in deciding the extent to
which subsequent public hearings should involve informal or formal
proceedings. If a diverse group of stakeholders has participated in a
thorough negotiation process that has been reported on the World
Wide Web and EPA has responded already to comments from national environmental and environmental justice organizations, then
the need for formal adjudicatory procedures to rehash these issues is
excessive. On the other hand, if industry brings new evidence or experts into the permit process after stakeholder negotiations have
ended, the public is entitled to a chance to question the persuasiveness
of that new evidence. For new evidence or experts, the statute would
require the use of formal adjudicatory procedures, especially cross[d. at 3.
473. See id. at 2-3, section 2.a.l.
474. See id. at 3, section 2.a.2.
475. [d. at 3, section 2.a.3.
476. [d.
472.
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examination, as set forth in Sections 554, 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Alternatively, under the statute either the agency or the firm may
reopen stakeholder negotiations if either party introduces significant
new evidence. A process that just required informal public hearings
might create an incentive for firms to withhold information during the
potentially intensive review of stakeholder negotiations and wait until
an informal hearing without cross-examination to introduce controversial or damaging evidence. Presumably, the permitting agency or
environmental groups would raise questions or objections if a firm
was apparently avoiding discussion of important issues during the
stakeholder negotiation process and raising them only at the public
hearing stage of the process. But requiring formal adjudicatory procedures for new evidence or experts would further encourage a company to disclose promptly new information during stakeholder
negotiations. Industry might object to the expense of formal proceedings, but in most cases the entire hearing probably could be informal if
no new evidence exists. The fact that EPA has voluntarily offered the
public the opportunity to request a hearing regarding draft final project agreements or site-specific rulemaking suggests that the proposed
statute's more limited right to a public hearing is responsive to industry's concerns. There may be situations in which it is unavoidable for
a firm to introduce evidence after the stakeholder negotiation process
ends, but this evidence ought to be subject either to formal proceedings or reopened stakeholder negotiations so that all evidence receives
approximately the same degree of scrutiny.
Accordingly, the proposed statute would establish a hybrid approach to public hearings. If the agency reasonably believes that an
issue has been adequately discussed during stakeholder negotiation
and a company expert was available for dialog during that process,
then an informal public hearing without the right to cross-examination
is adequate. On the other hand, if late in the application process an
applicant seeks to introduce new evidence that was unavailable during
the stakeholder negotiation process then the proposed statute would
require the permitting agency to use trial-type procedures to allow
cross-examination of newly introduced experts or evidence under the
rules set forth in Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act for formal adjudicatory hearings, or, in the alternative, to
reopen stakeholder negotiations. 477 This hybrid rule would create an
incentive for companies to disclose evidence and experts during the
early stages of the permit process.
477. See 5 U.S.c. §§ 554, 556, 557; Mank, Exception Process, supra note 16, at 338-40
(discussing advantages and disadvantages of public hearings).
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The Froelich Memorandum addresses the circumstances under
which EPA will consider the modification of an XL project to be a
significant departure warranting lengthy review or an insignificant
change that is not subject to public review. 478 The Memorandum fails
to guarantee public involvement in cases where the new activity is
deemed either insignificant or a significant departure but a noncontroversial issue within the authority of the EPA administrator in charge
of the Project XL program. At least for significant departures that the
agency believes are noncontroversial, EPA should provide a notice in
the Federal Register and provide the public with an opportunity to
request a public hearing to challenge the new activity. It may be too
costly and burdensome on industry to subject allegedly "insignificant"
changes to either public hearings or notice in the Federal Register, but
Congress could require sponsors to post their documentation on the
World Wide Web and notify former direct participants and commentors about such changes to allow them the opportunity to comment to EPA.
c.

Judicial Review and Enforcement of Permits

A more immediate concern is the extent to which the public
ought to be able to challenge final project agreements between EPA
and a project sponsor. Under the Administrative Procedure Act or
under the various environmental statutes that may be modified by
Project XL, a person who is injured by a Project XL agreement likely
has the right to file suit. 479
i. The Status Quo: In Need of Change
Although EPA proposes to eliminate formal adjudicatory hearings under the Clean Water Act, the agency "believes that the ability
to judicially challenge final permits is an essential element of public
participation."48o In 1996, EPA issued a final rule that requires states,
but not tribes, to provide permittees and other interested parties an
opportunity for state judicial review comparable to that for federallyissued permits under Section 509 of the Clean Water Act as a means
"to provide for, encourage, and assist public participation in the
NPDES permitting process."481 The same reasoning applies to state
or federal judicial review of integrated or alternative compliance permits, and perhaps even more strongly because such permits often in478. See Froelich, supra note 470.
479. See supra Part I.B.2.d.ii.
480. Amendments to Streamline the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Program Regulations: Round Two, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,268, 65,279 n.3 (1996).
481. [d.; see generally 61 Fed. Reg. 20,972-75 (promulgating rule requiring states to
allow broad range of interested parties the opportunity to challenge NPDES permits in
state court.).
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clude more unusual or nonstandard terms that require greater public
scrutiny than a cookie-cutter, standard NPDES permit-although
there are often significant permitting issues requiring public debate
even under traditional single-medium regulatory programs. A court
reviewing an alternative compliance agreement should closely examine the procedures used in developing a final agreement to ensure
that the agency was reasonably fair in assembling a stakeholder group,
in conducting a public hearing, and in addressing significant health
Issues.
11.

Proposal for Change

To clarify the extent of jUdicial review, Congress should give "any
citizen" injured-in-fact the right to file a citizens suit, after appropriate
notice to EPA and the relevant state environmental agency, to challenge the terms of an XL agreement. But it should allow an agreement that has survived all judicial challenges to serve as a shield
against law suits under other environmental statutes. Under the proposed statute, any person injured-in-fact would have sixty days to
challenge a final Project XL agreement in the federal District Court
for the District of Columbia Circuit. The statute would centralize appeals in that circuit to provide greater uniformity for a program that
otherwise may be too inconsistent.
In addition, both permitting agencies and the public could sue to
enforce the terms of a final agreement, which would take precedence
over otherwise applicable requirements found in other statutes, but an
agreement that had survived judicial review would serve as a shield
against possible challenges under other statutes. Although the proposed alternative compliance regime would be voluntary, once a firm
has decided to participate in the program, EPA or any local permitting
agency should be able to seek penalties if the firm violates its agreement because the firm has benefitted from waiving otherwise applicable requirements and must live up to the alternative agreement. The
proposed regime would provide the sixty-day notice that environmental citizens' suit provisions generally require. 482 Following that notice,
any person would be able to bring a citizens' suit under the proposed
statute in the local district court against a firm for violating its agreement. The terms of a final agreement that has survived any judicial
challenges, however, would supersede any requirements under other
statutes. Under the Clean Air Act's Title V permit program, a permit
(which normally is issued for five years) that has survived all review
provides a shield against possible arguments that a firm is not comply482.

See, e.g., 42 U.s.c. § 7604(b)(1)(A).
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ing with certain relevant portions of the Act that were mistakenly left
out of the permit. 483
The main argument for giving industry such a shield is that firms
often make substantial investments based upon a permit's validity,
and that it would be unfair to allow a citizen suit after the normal
period for judicial challenges has expired. In the context of Project
XL, the statute of bring their suits before a firm has invested significant resources; firms participating in a Project XL agreement should
be confident that the agreement will sustain challenges brought under
other environmental laws. Accordingly, a citizen meeting relevant
standing requirements would have sixty days to challenge the validity
of a final Project XL agreement in the District Court for the District
of Columbia Circuit and could sue in the local district court to enforce
the terms of the agreement against a sponsor that fails to comply. But
after the sixty-day challenge period, a person could not bring a citizen
suit under another environmental statute contending that the agreement was in conflict with that statute.

d.

Annual Reports

The April 23, 1997 Notice of Modification does not address implementation issues. 484 The May 23, 1995 original Project XL Notice
does require projects to have clear objectives and requirements that
will be measurable to enable EPA and the public to evaluate the success of the project and to enforce its terms.485 The EPA recommends
that a final project agreement delineate the role of stakeholders during the evaluation and implementation of the project, and encourages
sponsors to provide for re-examination or periodic evaluation of the
project by direct participant stakeholders. 486
Instead of EPA's voluntary approach to public reporting by Project XL firms, the proposed statute would require sponsors to issue an
annual report. Mandating an annual report is relatively straightforward, but there are more difficult issues about what information a participant must report. For instance, a participant might explain why its
internal audit program is a good substitute for more conventional
monitoring or reporting requirements. In addition, the participant
should annually examine the impact of any cross-media or cross-pollutant trading. The effectiveness of the report should be a significant
factor in whether a permit is renewed. If a participant knowingly con483.
484.
485.
486.
27,287.

See
See
See
See

42 U.S.c. 7661c(f) (1997).
XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,880-81.
id. at 19,881; XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at 27,284, 27,287.
XL Modification, supra note 94, at 19,881; XL Pilot Projects, supra note 91, at
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veys misleading information in its report, the standard criminal penalties for reporting fraudulent information should apply.487
CONCLUSION

The shift from national, uniform regulation to more individualized, site-specific agreements between firms and permitting agencies
contains some risks of weakening public control, producing inconsistencies, and allowing "sweetheart" deals. The promise of more efficient and cleaner results, however, is so great that Congress ought to
enact a statute authorizing regulatory flexibility agreements as long as
careful attention is paid to fostering meaningful public participation,
and protecting the public, especially high-risk groups, from any undue
risks.
The EPA's April 23, 1997 Notice of Modification includes some
protections for public participation in the development of Project XL
proposals, but leaves too much discretion in the hands of project sponsors with only vague promises that EPA will take into account how
well sponsors address public participation in deciding whether to approve an XL proposal. Congress should insist upon broad public participation in any alternative permitting process, and require that
individual firms and EPA report regularly on the results. The proposed statute includes an inclusive stakeholder negotiation process,
provisions to protect minority voting interests, a technical assistance
grant program, informal or formal public hearings depending upon
whether an issue was already adequately discussed by direct participants, and annual reporting provisions. If Congress adopts these
measures, the public, including minority groups, should have a reasonable opportunity to express their views and to challenge industry proposals that are biased or dangerous. It is possible to achieve both
more efficient regulation and better public participation at the same
time.

487. See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 7413(c)(2) (criminal penalties under Clean Air Act for any
person who knowingly makes false statements); 33 U.S.c. § 1319(c)(4) (same under Clean
Water Act).
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